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ABUSE OF GLOBAL PLATFORM DOMINANCE OR COMPETITION ON THE MERITS?

Anca Chirita*
Abstract
Contrary to mainstream opinion, suggesting that dominant online platforms compete on their
own merits and that their abuse of the large-scale accumulation of data should fall under data
or privacy laws, this article argues that competition law should investigate whether global
platform competition has been established on merit alone and how digital dominance has been
strengthened through the downfall of emerging competition (the exclusionary harm) and the
excessive combination of individuals' data (exploitative harm). To frame the theory of
competitive harm in a global context, this article compares several of the most recent cases
involving digital giants such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon in both pro-active
jurisdictions, as well as in less interventionist jurisdictions. In doing so, the author challenges
the existing categorization of abuse of a dominant position, especially self-preferencing and
the excessive disclosure of data. This article advances the constitutional dimension of
competition law by recognizing the principle of nondiscrimination and equal treatment in
Google Shopping and the principle of autonomous self-determination in Facebook as
embedded in quasi-constitutional EU freedoms of free and fair competition for businesses and
free choice for consumers.
Keywords: competition law; digital dominance; behavioral discrimination; online platforms
Introduction
Decades ago, the immensurable role of competition law in the digital age was unforeseen.
It was unthinkable to predict that algorithms or artificial intelligence (AI) data would have
anything to do with competition between online platforms, or that the latter would shape
modern competition law. Since then, resistance has surfaced with scholars looking for newly
emerging data specialists to take responsibility for and ownership of the problems created by
the platforms' lack of meaningful consent from their users. Increasing popular sentiment means
the very soul of competition law and its well-established principles are at risk of crumbling.
How can competition law walk away from its doctrine of consumer harm instead of
embedding fundamental economic rights such as privacy? Why should competition law be
concerned about data sharing for anticompetitive purposes, third-party advertising, or data
brokering? In reality, and despite entrenched divisions in scholarship, the basic concept of
voluntary consent dates back to the early days of competition law, where weaker contractual
parties were at risk of exploitative behavior by the party in a powerful, and thus dominant,
position.
Safeguarding individual autonomy and freedom of contract was the theoretical standpoint
for the emergence of competition law from the law of contracts. Competition investigates the
abuse of monopoly power against weaker market players. Any imbalance in bargaining power
that did not fit within the monopoly power theory still fell under contract law. Later, the
contractual paternalism toward weaker parties suffered metamorphosis to embrace consumers.
Over time, competition law has also recognized consumer welfare as its foremost economic
goal. With the advent of digital technology giants, consumers have developed into individual
users of global platforms. Unfortunately, these users are unaware of the pitfalls of sharing their
1

data in exchange for online services such as universal search, social networking, or
marketplaces.
In contract theory, gratuitous transactions are still contractual, despite an obvious lack of
monetary consideration. However, even highly regarded competition authorities worldwide
still grapple with complex economic concepts such as dual- or multi-sided platforms, and the
excessive price users pay with their data for the use of online platforms. From the outset, global
platforms have purposively found a way to evade a binding promise by camouflaging data as
an unpaid monetary consideration to attract more users to a platform instantly.
Successful acquisition of more platform users and combinations of data leads to significant
profits from lucrative avenues. Targeted advertising analyzes users' behavioral preferences and
choices through sophisticated online tracking or digital fingerprinting to predict users'
reservation price by engaging in behavioral discrimination.1 Despite few empirical studies
evidencing this, recent legislative regulations have aimed to tackle online discrimination by
geo-blocking location tracking to promote the fairness and transparency of intermediation
platforms.2 The first recital of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 considers the tendency of platforms
* Assistant Professor of Competition Law, Durham University, Law School, UK, Dr. iur. (Europa-Institute,
Saarbrticken, Germany), Non-Governmental advisor to the International Competition Network for the European
Commission's Directorate-General for Competition.
1 For empirical evidence of targeted advertising and personalized pricing, see the COMMISSION FINAL REPORT:
CONSUMER MARKET STUDY ON ONLINE MARKET SEGMENTATION THROUGH PERSONALIZED PRICING/OFFERS IN

THE EUROPEAN UNION, EUR. COMM'N, 60, 240, 266 (Jul. 19, 2018) [hereinafter "Eur. Comm 'n"]. For a study on
the location data, preferences, and online profiling, see OPINION 06/2014 ON THE NOTION OF LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS OF THE DATA CONTROLLER UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC, ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION
WORKING PARTY, 844/14/EN WP 217 at 32 (Apr. 9, 2014). The UK Information Commissioner highlighted
platforms' business models driven by sophisticated behavioral advertising to achieve personalization. See ONLINE
PLATFORMS AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET, HL PAPER 129, 56. (April 20, 2016); See also Anca D. Chirita,
The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy, in PERSONAL DATA IN COMPETITION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TOWARDS A HOLISTIC APPROACH? 153, 165 (Mor Bakhoum et al. eds., 2018) (in
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favor of behavioral discrimination); See also Maurice E. Stucke, Here are All the Reasons It's a Bad Idea to Let
a Few Tech Companies Monopolize our Data, HARv. BUS. REv. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/hereare-all-the-reasons-its-a-bad-idea-to-let-a-few-tech-companies-monopolize-our-data; See also ARIEL EZRACHI
MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY

110 (2016); See also CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FED. TRADE COMM'N PRIV. L. AND POL'Y 147 (2016) (on first-degree
price discrimination and why privacy is not the solution); See also MARGRETHE VESTAGER, Comm'r for
Competition, SPEECH at CEPS Corporate Breakfast, GETTING THE BEST OUT OF technology 2 (Sep. 10, 2018) (on
the use of automatic price-tracking software by manufacturers) (transcript available on Thomson Reuters Practical
Law); See also UK COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (CMA), PRICING ALGORITHMS: ECONOMIC
WORKING PAPER ON THE USE OF ALGORITHMS TO FACILITATE COLLUSION AND PERSONALIZED PRICING 36 (Oct.

8, 2018) (on personalized pricing); See also Zuiderveen F. Borgesius & J. Poort, Online PriceDiscriminationand
EU Data Privacy Law, 40 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 347, 349 (2017);) (on Amazon's price changes due to cookies'
deletion). Amazon's tailored pricing is not a "hypothetical power," see Lina Khan, Amazon 'sAntitrust Paradox,
126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017).
2 As cosmologist, Martin J. Rees, once said: "Absence of evidence wouldn't be evidence of absence", see FROM
HERE TO INFINITY: SCIENTIFIC HORIZONS 109 (2011). For empirical evidence, see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman,
Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargainingfor a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 304 (1995). For women and
black shoppers offered higher prices for cars, see Anne Fitzpatrick, Shopping While Female: Who Pays Higher
Prices and Why?, 107 AM. ECON. REv. 146 (2017), and O.C. Ferrell et al., Expectations and Attitudes Toward
Gender-based Price Discrimination, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 1015 (2018), on violations of equal treatment. For
targeted advertising and price discrimination confer monopoly power over captive shoppers, see Rosa-Branca
Esteves & Joana Resende, Competitive Targeted Advertising with Price Discrimination, 35 MKTG. SCI. 582
(2016), on customers' exploitation of location data for geofencing (GPS recording of individual movements), and
for geo-conquesting (targeting consumers near competitors). For legislative progress, see REGULATION (EU)
2018/302 ADDRESSING UNJUSTIFIED GEO-BLOCKING AND OTHER FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
CUSTOMERS' NATIONALITY, PLACE OF RESIDENCE OR PLACE OF ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET
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with superior bargaining power to behave unilaterally and unfairly towards businesses and
consumers. Where platforms unilaterally determine contractual terms and conditions, a caseby-case assessment could reveal unfair competition irrespective of the relative size of the
parties and whether they had negotiated the terms.3 Under perfect competition, parties negotiate
in good faith or the spirit of fair dealing.4
Similar to the global reach of EU competition law, Recital 9, in conjunction with Article 1
(2) of the above regulation, confers extraterritorial application to transnational corporations if
they offer intermediation platforms to businesses and consumers inside the EU. Notable
examples include search engines, social media, and online marketplaces, which mirror the
competition concerns over Google, Facebook, and Amazon as landmark cases in this article.
Defenses based on product design and internal algorithms have not always proven
successful before the competition authorities, and much less a defense based on providing a
free online service alone. However, institutional choices of leaving the conundrum of datadriven global platforms to data-protection authorities alone, or even to future regulation, reflect
a divided international landscape. This author argues that the cause of such inherent tensions
lies in divergent regulatory regimes with economics attempting to bridge the divide. Therefore,
beyond a follow-up effect present in a few jurisdictions, there is ambivalence regarding how
competition authorities approach global platform dominance issues, which has inspired the
present research.
This article argues that competition law should investigate whether global platform
competition has been established on merit alone and how digital dominance has been
strengthened through the downfall of emerging competition (the exclusionary harm) and
excessive combination of individuals' data (exploitative harm). To frame the theory of
competitive harm in a global context, this article compares several of the most recent cases
involving digital giants such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon in both pro-active jurisdictions
in the European Union, Germany, and India, as well as in less interventionist jurisdictions such
as the US, Canada, and the UK. The author challenges the existing categorization of abuse of
a dominant position, especially self-preferencing and excessive data disclosure. The
jurisdictional divide in dealing with global platform dominance captures the convergence built
by competition authorities on a common ground approach to online dominance and the dissent
from the former. Ultimately, this article advances the constitutional dimension of competition
law by recognizing the principle of nondiscrimination and equal treatment in Google Shopping
and the principle of autonomous self-determination in Facebook as embedded in quasiconstitutional EU freedoms of free and fair competition for businesses as well as free choice
for consumers.
However, this article opposes an antitrust mind-set that looks disapprovingly at cases
involving innovative technologies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon as going into the
unchartered territory of competition law. These cases are early-stage tests for modern
competition laws. As the digital economy is rapidly expanding, global platforms replace
traditional trade with stock storage by manufacturing on demand. Therefore, anticompetitive
and amending Regulations (EC) No. 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2018 O.J. (L
601) recital 18, Art. 5 [hereinafter REG. 2018/302]. See also Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 ON PROMOTING FAIRNESS
AND TRANSPARENCY FOR BUSINESS USERS OF ONLINE INTERMEDIATION SERVICES, 2019 O.J. (L 186) 57

[hereinafter Reg. 2019/1150].
3 See Reg. 2019/1150, supra note 2, at recital 14.
4

Id. at recital 32, Art. 8.
3

practices should be carefully revisited. In some instances, the changes are merely cosmetic; in
others, they are more dramatic. For the latter, public belief is an attempt to punish monopolists
that pioneer their users' digital experience unduly. Thus, instead of crowning such digital
monopolists as winners, the public will often remember their anticompetitive conduct vis-a-vis
global users, namely individual consumers, intermediate customers, or rival competitors.
The Comparative Context
Without any doubt, Google has been the bane of competition authorities worldwide,
including in the EU, the US, the UK, Canada, India, Turkey, South Korea, Russia, and Brazil.5
Nothing has been more dramatic than the EU Commission's (hereafter, the Commission) triple
fine of E8.25 billion imposed on Google for its EU market performance. Due to these
developments, competition law has become more international than ever. In contrast to the
legendary Microsoft case, 6 triggered by its rival, Sun Microsystems, and Microsoft's duty to
ensure interoperability with its operating system, the Google Shopping case was fueled by a
torpedo of complaining competitors that included Microsoft, Foundem, Yelp, Streetmap,
Expedia, and TripAdvisor, as well as publishers, consumer associations such as BEUC, and
the Italian competition authority. 7 Striking similarities among such digital giants include being
remarkably capable of offering their customers additional services free of charge. For example,
Microsoft offers Media Player and Explorer at no cost, Google offers a universal search and
Android's Apps Store, and Facebook offers a social network. Thus, global competition
authorities, realizing something had gone wrong, have placed digital monopolies under intense
scrutiny.

Reshaping Data in the Assessment of Digital Dominance
Digital data or big data have received global recognition from competition authorities
through their assessment of the dominance of big data in digital markets. In line with previous
case law, the European Commission ("EC") considers free offerings as an economic activity.'
A year ago, the Canadian Competition Bureau ("CBC") similarly recognized that, although
users do not pay for search engines, they provide data with each query. 9 The EC provided
further credit for data. Despite a lack of monetary consideration for universal search services,
s See Bahadir Balki, Google Fined This Time by the Turkish Competition Watchdog, KLUWER COMP. L. BLOG

&

(Nov. 5, 2018) http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/11/05/google-fined-this-time-by-theturkish-competition-watchdog/?print=print; See also Sarah Perez, Google Reaches $7.8 Million Settlement in its
Android Antitrust Case in Russia, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 17, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/17/googlereaches-7-8-million-settlement-in-its-android-antitrust-case-in-russia/; See also Sohn JI-young, Google Play
under FTC Investigation in Korea for Alleged Abuse of Market Position, KOREA HERALD (Apr. 16, 2018)
www.koreaherald.com/common/newsprint.php?ud=20180416000718; See also Paulo Burnier da Silveira
Victor O. Fernandes, Google Shopping in Brazil: Highlights of CADE's Decision and Takeaways for Digital
Economy Issues, CONCURRENCES E-BULL. (Aug. 9, 2019) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435159.
6See

Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R II-03601.
See Council Regulation 1/2003 of Jun. 6th 2017 Relating to proceedings under Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, 2017 O.J.
[hereinafter EC], pending appeal, 2018 O.J. (C445) 21, 21-22.
8
See EC, supra note 7, at 152 (referring to Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Comm'n, at 966-70); See also Competition
- Concentrations - European markets for internet communications services - Decision declaring the
concentration compatible with the internal market - Manifest errors of assessment - Obligation to state reasons
(Cisco Sys. & Messagenet v. Comm'n), 2013 ECLI 635 at 65-74.
?

9 CBC, COMPETITION BUREAU'S STATEMENT REGARDING ITS INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED ANTI-COMPETITIVE

CONDUCT BY GOOGLE (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04066.html;
See also EC, supra note 7, at 158.
4

users monetize their own Internet data in accordance with Google's contractual terms of service
on privacy. 10 The Competition Commission of India ("CCI") also successfully applied the
latest understanding of how Google's search-engine generates Al data drawing on users' IP
addresses and locations." The CCI found Google to be the dominant platform for both
universal search and advertising.12 Due to the significant value attached to data, the German
Supreme Court ("SC") also considered, in its case against Facebook, that a lack of monetary
consideration cannot deny the existence of a market for social media under the statutory
requirements of Section 18 (2) (a), as introduced by the 9 th Amendment to the Act against
Restraints of Competition ("ARC")." This section was intended to address dominance in
digital markets where a good or service is provided free of charge. Both the Bundeskartellamt
("BKartA") and the SC recognized that any monetary consideration comes from the targeted
advertising of Facebook's users." It was irrelevant that these users did not pay anything, as by
using Facebook, they met an economic demand and supplied their data to advertisers." Under
Section 19 (2) no 2 ARC, one could interpret "other terms" to include gratuitous transactions
with a zero-priced service where data is the price to be paid in exchange for the service. 16
Therefore, the SC recognized that Facebook receives an economic benefit by facilitating the
acquisition and commercial exploitation of users' data, irrespective of whether such data are
proprietary. Nonetheless, the acquisition of "more" data increases its economic value.1 8
Concomitantly, due to the attractiveness of its global platform, Google generates significant
revenues from advertising ($79.4 billion in 2016), while Amazon reached E198 billion in 2018
with a 40% share of the German e-commerce market. 19
However, while Section 18 ARC came into force in June 2017, the investigation of
Facebook had already begun in March 2016. For this reason, the Higher Regional Court of
Dusseldorf ("HRC") did not retroactively apply the new provisions applicable to digital
markets. 20 Similarly, Regulation 2019/1150 was the first to acknowledge that an intermediation
platform shares data, which is unnecessary for the platform's functioning and monetizes such
See EC, supra note 7, at 320; See also number 82 at 158, on Google's Privacy Policy.
" See Joined Cases 07 & 30/2012 Google LLC, Google India, & Google Ireland, CCI, (Decision of Feb. 8, 2018),
at 6, 31, 158 [hereinafter CCI].
12
Id. at 8.
13 See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion
of having abused its
10

market
power
by
infringing
data
protection
rules
(Mar.
2,
2016),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.ht
ml?nn=3591568; See also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jun. 23, 2020, Entscheidungen
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ], 60, 27, (excluding free services offered without any economic
purpose) [hereinafter SC].
" See B6-22/16 Facebook, at 239, 240, and 243 Feb. 6, 2019, at 28, 32 (acknowledges EU developments regarding
transactions without monetary consideration, e.g., Microsoft, Google, Facebook/WhatsApp, and Microsoft/Skype;
SC
and Facebook) [hereinafter BKartA].
15
Id. at 246; See also SC, supra note 14, at 29, 62.
16 See BKartA, supra note 14, at 378-9. The same applies to Art. 102 (a) on unfair trading conditions.
17 See SC, supra note 13, at 61, (relying on its earlier ruling of Apr. 12, 2016, KZR 30/14 Net Cologne I,
WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 427 (2016), but dismissing the controversy of internally generated data); See
e.g., Michael Eichberger, Rechte an Daten Verfassungsrechtliches Eigentum an Daten, 12
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 709 (2019).
18 See SC, supra note 13, at 62.

See EC, supra note 7, at 296; See also Case B2-88/18 Amazon, BUNDESKARTELLAMT ,Jul. 17, 2019,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2019/B2-8819

18.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=5.
See Case VI-Kart 1/19 (V) Facebook v. BKartA, Higher Regional Court of Dusseldorf (Oberlandesgerich),7
(Aug.
26,
2019),http://www.olgduesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20190826_PM_Facebook/20190826-Beschluss-VI-Kart-119-_V.pdf [hereinafter HRC] (the HRC expressed serious doubts over BKartA's administrative decision).
20

data for trading purposes. 2 1 These platforms will also be held accountable for sharing
aggregateddata, which is a huge step forward in addressing behavioral discrimination.22
Offering search services free of charge is a smart strategy for dual or multi-sided platforms
such as Google or Facebook. Both act as intermediaries between advertisers and users. 23
Following the German amendment to the assessment of dominance in digital markets, access
to data is a relevant factor to be considered. 2 4 This prompted BKartA to paradoxically advance
that there is a greater willingness to share data than to pay for social networking. Indeed,
Facebook users have no other realistic choice but to consent to data sharing. 25 This author
agrees that consent is neither effective nor voluntary but forced onto users. 26 Similarly, the CCI
recognized that consumers lose control over their data through intrusive advertising or
behavioral discrimination.27 By attracting more users to its platform, Google increases its
appeal to potential advertisers that fund or cross-subsidize 2 ' Google's zero-priced service.
The SC also realized the danger of cross-subsidization favoring Facebook's advertising side
of the market, which has been supplied with the personal data of active users on the market for
social networking. 2 9 The SC stressed that Facebook's combination of these data increased the
usefulness and value of data, but dismissed the HRC's argument that users are not precluded
from making that data available to other businesses.3 0 As users do not have access to their data,
which is used for a more personalized experience, they cannot make the data available to third
parties.3 1 For the SC, Facebook's personalized experience went beyond what Facebook had
stipulated in its contractual terms by morphing users into intermediaries. Relying on Article 3
concerning the scope of application of Directive (EU) 2019/770, the SC acknowledged
consideration in personal data.3 2 This provision does not apply only where consumers pay a
price, but also where consumers offer their data in exchange. In other words, to supply digital
products or services, businesses will process consumer data.

See Reg. 2019/1150, supra note 2, at recital 34.

21

22

Id. at Art. 9(2)(c).

23 See EC, supra note 7, at 159; See Facebook, at 219-20 (referring to indirect network effects).For advertising
funded services, consumers pay with their data, see JASON FURMAN ET. AL., REPORT OF THE DIGITAL COMPETITION

EXPERT PANEL: UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 22 (Mar. 2019).
24), See BKartA, supra note 14, at 108, 136 (the 9 th Amendment to Section 18 (3a), on monopolization through

market-tipping).
25 Id. at 107-8; Cf HRC, supra note 20, at 29 (dismissing the privacy paradox); See also Torsten Kdrber, Die
Facebook-Entscheidungdes Bundeskartellamtes Machtmissbrauchdurch Verletzung des Datenschutzrechts?,4
N.Z.KART. 192 (2019). For the GDPR's unintended consequences which may limit data sharing between
platforms, see Michal S. Gal & Oshrit Aviv, The Competitive Effects of the GDPR, 16 J.COMP. L. & EC. 349,

(2020).
See BKartA, supra note 14, at 184-6.
See CC[, supra note 11, at 31-32.
28 For recognition of cross-subsidization, see Id., at 33.
29 See SC, supra note 13, at 62; See also Jochen Mohr, Kartellrechtlicher Konditionenmissbrauch
durch
datenschutzwidrigeAllgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen Die Facebook-Entscheidung des Bundeskartellamts v.
6.2.2019, 19 EuZW 7, 265-68 (2019); Mohr, Wettbewerbsrecht und Okonomie im digitalen 21. Jahrhundert:
Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Intel-Entscheidung des Europdischen Gerichtshofs und zum Facebook-Verfahren des
Bundeskartellamts, 69 ORDO 1 259 (2019).
30 See SC, supra note 13, at 62.
26
27

31
32

Id.
See Directive 2019/770,

of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 20 2019 on certain aspects

concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, 2019 O.J. (L136) 1 (EU); See SC supra
note 13, at 63 (referring to Facebook's terms of service).
6

However, Google can be credited with competing on the merits of the speed and relevance
of its results and the depth of its content. 33 Compared to Bing's or Baidu's low market shares,
Google has dominated a universal search with an 80.47% share of the PC market and 94.87%
of the mobile market.3 4 Based on the number of daily and monthly users, Facebook dominates
the market for social networking with 90% and 80 to 85% share of the market.3 5 Thus, the SC
agreed that BKartA had established Facebook's dominance based on an examination of all
relevant factors, not just paramount market shares.3 6
From the multitude of services offered by Google, such as flights, hotels, or restaurants, the
EC examined the anticompetitive effects in the market for comparison shopping. 37 There is
certainly merit in that online retailers do not provide customers with comparison offers from
elsewhere. Other platforms, such as Amazon Marketplace or eBay, act as sales
intermediaries.3 8 There is also merit in the CCJ's finding of market leveraging through
Google's flight unit.39 Thus, in search of originality, the CBS was the first to acknowledge
Google's exclusionary conduct vis-a-vis rival services, including maps, local reviews, and
travel, and Google's preferential placement due to subjective ranking criteria. 40 In India,
Google's Flight Unit was displayed more prominently than its rivals due to Google's dissimilar
algorithm, effectively forcing rivals to acquire traffic through paid advertising. 4 1
As comparison-shopping websites rely on being shown in a universal search, they incur
significant additional costs. 42 Indeed, comparison-shopping services earn revenues when
customers click on their websites. 43 As an intermediary agent, Google Shopping offered a price
comparison service that included various traders but excluded rivals. 4 4 In turn, a different
ranking algorithm was applied to Google Shopping. 45
As Google had exceptionally large shares of the market for a longer period, it enjoyed
economic strength as an unavoidable trading partner.46 In the spirit of Hoffmann-LaRoche, 47
Google prevented effective competition. Likewise, the CCI effectively mirrored the same
doctrine of dominance, recognizing Google as an unavoidable trading partnerto advertisers. 48
Apart from market circumstances where large market shares turn out to be ephemeral,
especially due to shorter innovation cycles, the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position
under Article 102 TFEU could, nonetheless, be triggered where there is no sign of instability.

33

See EC, supra note 7, at 160.

34

Id. at 184 (noting Bing enjoys 7.15% and Baidu 5.59%).

BKartA, supra note 14, at 393; Ger. Sup. Ct., supra note 13, at 38.
36 See Ger. Sup. Ct., supra note 13, at 90 (referencing Facebook's paramount market position).
37 Eur. Comm'n, supra note 1, at 192.
38
Id. at 210, 216.
39 CCI, supra note 11, at 248.94; see Competition & Mkt. Auth., supra note 1, at 41 (showing evidence of online
discrimination by hotels and ticket sales among affluent, budget conscious, and clean browsing profiles).
40 Can. Competition Bureau, supra note
9, at 6.
41 CCI, supra note 11, at 159 ; cf with Dissent Note at 169-70.
42 Eur. Comm'n, supra note 1, at 195.
43 Id. at 226.
44
Id. at 220 (noting a vertical business relationship with Amazon).
45
Id. at 203; Margrethe Vestager, Speech at the Eur. Comm'n: When Technology Serves People (Jun. 1, 2018).
46 Eur. Comm 'n, supra note 1, at 264, 266.
47 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n of the Eur. Comm'n, 1979, at 38; Eur. Comm'n, supra
note 1, at 333.
48 CCI, supra note 11, at 21, 103; see id. at 6, 330 (explaining how Google is an unavoidable
trading partner).
35
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Instead, that market has a stable hierarchy. 49 In contrast, the CCI examined how Google
consistently maintained its dominance for a shorter period. 50 Later, the CCI recognized that
innovation could disrupt established market positions.5 1 Similarly, Section 18 (3) (a) ARC
considers competitive pressure in highly innovative markets. Such pressure could become
highly disruptive. 52 Thus, after seven years of Facebook's dominance, BKartA had no similar
indications. The SC agreed that the competitive pressure caused by such disruptive innovation
must be assessed carefully; it cannot become an abstract matter either substantively or
temporarily. 53 This pressure barely caused any vulnerability to Facebook's dominant market
position.5 4
When assessing Google's dominance, the EC recognized the paramount role that the volume
of data plays in the relevance of search results.55 This partially explains the lack of success of
alternative search engine solutions. Other reasons accounted for the lack of reliance on location
data, more limited indexing, or slower updating. 56 Google uses a large volume of data that is
amassed from its users. Comparatively, this resonates with the US dissenting opinion, where
the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter FTC) closed its investigation against Google.
Similarly, Google's monopolistic power stemmed from "the control over user data" through
deceptive means, which is an unfair method of competition. 7 Indeed, any new entrant to a
universal search would face significant investments, but only a minority of users would use an
alternative for searching the Internet.5 8 Owing to its reputation, users trust Google to offer the
most relevant search results. 59
However, Google could reduce the quality of its service without the risk that a significant
number of users would eventually switch to its rivals. 60 Similarly, Facebook's lock-in effects
on users have led to high barriers to switching due to technical incompatibility and a lack of
data portability. 6 1 According to the SC, in the absence of these lock-in effects, namely, under
effective competition, Facebook would offer its users the choice of greater autonomy over
access to their data and, ultimately, the choice of a personalized experience as to whether the
latter should include Facebook data or not.6 2 As Facebook's behavior is not choice-driven, the
SC found it to be exploitative of users. 6 3
A Special Responsibility to Equality and Fairness: Dismissing
Exclusionary Demotion

Self-Favoring

for

Following the previous case law, the EC has drawn on the special responsibility of a dominant
undertaking not to distort competition in the market by ensuring that the principle of equality
49 Eur. Comm 'n, supra note 1, at 267, 271, 274 (describing Google's strong and stable market shares).

50 CCI, supra note 11, at 20.

Id. at 197.

51

52 Bundeskartellamt, supra note 14, at 501-02, 521, 550.

Ger. Sup. Ct., supra note 13, at 51.

53
54

1 d. at 52.

5 Eur. Comm 'n, supra note 1, at 288.
56
Id. at 289.
"7111-0163 Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Comm'r J. Thomas Rosch Regarding Google's Search
Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 111-0163 (January 3, 2012).
58 Eur. Comm 'n, supra note 1, at 291, 306.
59
Id. at 312.
60
Id. at 324.
61 Bundeskartellamt, supra note 14, at 452, 461,
469.
62 Ger. Sup. Ct., supra note 13, at
86.
63
Id. at 87.
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among all economic operators is safeguarded. 6 4 This responsibility is legally construed as an
obligation imposed on dominant undertakings, not to abuse their position by restricting
competition. Otherwise, there is potential for leveraging that position in the market where
undertakings are dominant or in "separate, but related markets."' 6 5 The BKartA, too, referred
to Facebook's special responsibility not to unilaterally impose business terms on its users over
which they cannot exert any influence. 66 Furthermore, the SC embraced a unique special
responsibility for designing the platform's terms of use in line with Facebook users' right to
informational self-determination. 67 Inspired by the European principle of nondiscrimination,
the CC found that Google had behaved discriminatorily regarding both search and advertising,
thus harming advertisers and, indirectly, consumers. 6 8
As mentioned previously, the exclusion of comparison-shopping websites from Google
Shopping was one of the EC's first concerns. This conduct became exclusionary as Google had
not only positioned its Shopping Unit "more favorably" but also diverted traffic from rival
comparison-shopping services. 6 9
This article dismisses the mainstream categorization of Google's conduct as naked selffavoring. 70 It argues that its practical novelty can be much better, captured as an exclusionary
demotion of rival services through different algorithms than those applicable to Google
Shopping, which, in turn, leads to consumer harm. 7 1 This categorization follows the EC's wellestablished standard of anticompetitive foreclosure, leading to consumer harm. Otherwise, a

Eur. Comm'n, supra note 1, at 341; see Margrethe Vestager, The Future of European Values (Oct. 3, 2018)
(noting the equality of opportunity rarely appears in the policy discourse; for example, equality before the law).
See also Jan Wouters, ConstitutionalLimits of Differentiation: The Principle of Equality, THE MANY FACES OF
64

DIFFERENTIATION IN EU LAw (Dec. 2001).
65 EUR. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT FROM THE COMM'N TO THE PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUR. ECON. AND
SOC. COMM. AND THE COMM. OF THE REGIONS COMM'N at 9 (Jul. 15, 2019).
66

Bundeskartellamt, supra note 14, at 677, 894.

67
68

Ger. Sup. Ct., supra note 13, at 124.
CCI, supra note 11, at 3.

See Eur. Comm'n, supra note 1, at 331 (arguing in favor of exclusionary conduct but no self-favoring or
discrimination; see also Renato Nazzini, Unequal Treatment by Online Platforms: A StructuredApproach to the
69

Abuse

Test in Google, THE NOTION OF RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION: REVISITING THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN EUROPE (2017).

See Nicolo Zingales, Google Shopping: beware of 'self-favouring' in a world of algorithmic nudging, CPI
Antitrust Chron. (Feb. 13, 2018); Pedro Carlo Sousa, What Shall We Do About Self-Preferencing, CPI Antitrust
Chron. (Jun. 24, 2020); Alessandra Tonazzi & Gabriele Carovano, DigitalPlatformsand Self-Preferencing, CPI
Antitrust Chron. (Jun. 24, 2020); Rod Carlton & Rikki Haria, Self-Preferencing Legal and Regulatory
Uncertaintyfor the DigitalEconomy (andBeyond?), CPI Antitrust Chron. (Jun. 24, 2020). See also Niamh Dunne,
Public Interest and EU Competition Law, 65 ANTITRUST BULL. (2020) at 278 (recognizing self-preferencing as
"the most prominent theory of harm"); cf. for a more nuanced categorization of "salient bias and undue
prominence" to Google's own vertically integrated platform, see Amelia Fletcher, The EU Google Decisions:
Extreme Enforcement or the Tip of the BehaviouralIceberg, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Jan. 2019); opposing selffavouring as misleading and obscure legal category, see Pablo Ibiez Colomo, Self-Preferencing: Yet Another
Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, (2020) at 4; for a balanced approach, see Inge Graef, Differentiated
Treatment in Platform-to Business Relations: EU Competition Law and Economic Dependence, 38 YEL (2019)
at 452-53 (distinguishing naked self-preferencing from differentiated treatment and secondary-line
discrimination).
71 Eur. Comm'n, supra note 1, at 344; Furman, supra note 23, at 63 (describing the demotion of rivals due to
Google's algorithmic design).
70
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standalone categorization of self-favoring belongs to unfair competition 72 because it harms
competitors, rather than consumers or the competitive process.
However, even exclusionary demotion lacks originality as it is the product of a legal
"transplant" 73 from the FTC's findings of Google's algorithm and product design. Google had
"demoted all but one or two comparison shopping" services from the first to a later page of its
universal search, causing rivals to lose traffic. 74 Neither the FTC nor the CBC found any
conclusive evidence 7 5 to support a successful claim that Google had manipulated its search
algorithm to engage in unfair competition vis-a-vis Google's vertically integrated services.
This does not mean that there was no substantive merit in their cases; rather, the FTC and CBS
had insufficient robust evidence to go ahead further. There can be little if no doubt that
exclusionary demotion leads to anticompetitive harm. One major cross-jurisdictional
difference is that the FTC found Google's conduct objectively justified. 7 6
Another legal transplant considered by the CCI concerns the EU commitments offered to
Google, especially the demotion of advertisers due to search manipulation. 77 This caused
frustration due to such commitments being extraterritorially applied to a different statutory
architecture in India. 78 Partially concurring with the EC, the CCI found Google's services
prominently displayed. Critical for online visibility, this was likely to eliminate competition
through search bias and manipulation. 79 In addition, Google denied access and refused to
license content to rival search engines as a universal gateway to the Internet. 80 Again, the CCI
relied on another legal transplant from the EU, namely Google's special responsibility to ensure
fairness in online searches and advertising."
Why have commentators preferentiallylabeled Google's conduct as the lesser of the above
two evils, namely "self-favoring"? 2 One tentative answer is that this categorization is eyecatching through simplification. However, the definitive answer is that by eliciting the
exclusionary harm through demotion and differentiated algorithms, it loses sight of the wider
picture. Furthermore, the principle of equality of opportunity-often referred to as fair

For the view that self-favoring leads to unfair competition, see Andrei Hagiu, et. al., ShouldAmazon be allowed
to sell on its own marketplace? (Aug. 18, 2020) at 2.
73 08-03 See e.g., Michal Gal, The 'Cut and Paste' of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Isr.l: Conditions for a
Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J. OF L. REFORM, N.Y. UNIV. L. & EC. RSCH. PAPER No. 08-03 (2007) (noting how
this has proven to be a "Trojan horse").
74
In the Matter of GoogleInc., F.T.C. File No. 111-0163 (January 3, 2013).
71 Can. Competition Bureau, supra note
9, at 2.
72

76 MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST L. IN THE NEW ECON.: GOOGLE, YELP, LIBOR, AND THE CONTROL OF

INFORMATION. 122 (Harvard Univ. Press 2017).
77
CCI, supra note 11 at 23, 129.
78 Id. at 161. India's extraterritoriality in Section 32 of its competition law empowers the CCI to impose fines on
transnational corporations, see Vinod Dhall, India: The Competition Act and its Enforcement, in COMPETITION
LAW TODAY: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND THE LAW IN PRACTICE 574 (Vinod Dhall ed., 2019).
79 CCI, supra note 11, at 5-6, 22, 24; see id. at 262. for the lack of a manual manipulation of algorithms that are

automatically generated by machines.
80
Id. at 11, 325.
81
d. at 202.
82 See Margrethe Vestager, Speech at the Lisbon Web Summit: Clearing the Path for Innovation (Nov. 7, 2017);
see also, Case C-525/16 Servigos de Communiques e Multimedia SA v. Autoridade da Concurrecia
ECLI:EU:C:2018:270, at 24. [hereinafter Servigos]
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competition-and nondiscrimination are all enshrined in the Preamble of the Treaty of
Lisbon. 83
As a matter of prevailing principle, the same standard 4 of algorithmic ranking should apply
to all comparison-shopping websites. Deviations are, therefore, subject to unequal or
differentiated treatment such as demotion, dimming, or manipulation, as mentioned in
Regulation 2019/1150. Usefully, only ex-post, this regulation imposes a duty to reveal the main
parameters-but not algorithms-on intermediation platforms, determining the rankings and
including any payment received that might influence such rankings.8 5 Where there is no
contractual relationship between a search engine platform and its users, no such duty is
applicable. For Google, such a duty exists due to its privacy policy, which includes standard
terms and conditions for businesses and individual users. 86 In addition, for vertically integrated
marketplaces such as Amazon, there is an obligation to refrain from the differentiatedtreatment
of rivals, which could undermine fair competition and restrict consumer choice.8 7
The Principle of Non-Discrimination Applicable to Rankings
This article argues that the EC's legal reasoning in Google Shopping originates in a wider
interpretation of nondiscrimination, which safeguards an equal treatment norm: Google should
rank all comparison-shopping websites in the same way, irrespective of affiliation to or
ownership by Google. Concomitantly, the EC's decision did not apply the discrimination test
of Article 102 (c), which applies to "dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions" 8 8 for two
reasons.
First, this article argues that Google's conduct is unequal treatment of rival comparison
websites through naked discrimination. The latter does not necessarily demand the exclusion
of rivals if it distorts competition in the downstream market for comparison shopping and offers
an advantage to another trading partner, namely the Shopping Unit, which is vertically
integrated into Google. 89 This also fits much better into the context of the second limb of Article
102 (a) on imposing "unfair trading conditions" or even unfair terms of service.
First mentioned in the Spaak Report in 1956 and later in the preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon, see Anca D.
Chirita, A Legal-HistoricalReview of the EU Competition Rules, 63 I.C.L.Q 304 (2014); on the distinction
between fair competition and unfair trading, Johannes Laitenberger, COMMISSION'S DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR
83

Competition,

SPEECH: EU COMPETITION LAW IN INNOVATION AND DIGITAL MARKETS: FAIRNESS AND THE
CONSUMER WELFARE PERSPECTIVE 4 (Oct. 10, 2017).

See Eur. Comm'n, supra note 1 at 440 (there is nothing wrong with Google applying certain relevance
standards); FURMAN, supra note 23, at 33, 61 (for platform prominence, rankings, and reviews to be designated
on a fair, consistent, and transparent basis).
85 Recitals 26 & 28 in conjunction with Comm'n Regul. 2019/1150, art. 5, 2019 O.J. (L 186) 15, 16.
86 See Google's Privacy Policy, https://policies.google.com/privacy.
87 Recitals 30 & 31 for intermediation platforms in conjunction with Comm'n Regul. 2019/1150, art. 7, 2019 O.J.
(L 186) 16,17.
88 For the latest ruling on first-degree price discrimination, see Servigos, supra note 82, at 19 (the court clarified
that proof that this conduct can restrict competition is required, affecting direct competitors in the same relevant
market; categorically against a classical discrimination but supportive of a standalone abuse that leads to market
distortion downstream),; See also Nazzini, supra note 69 relies (relies on the principle of legal certainty and Art.
7 E.C.H.R, both of which are not applicable to Google).
89 Thomas Eilmansberger, Article 82, in COMPETITION LAW: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1138, at 2.15.246 (Gunther Hirsch, Frank Montag & Franz J. Sacker eds., 2008) (on mere discrimination against
a contractual partner); Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini & Hans Zengler, Article 102, in THE EU LAW OF
COMPETITION 525 at 4.895 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 2014); Rhodri Thompson, Christopher Brown
Nicholas Gibson, Article 102, in BELLAMY & CHILD EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF COMPETITION 802, at 10.083
(Vivien Rose & David Bailey eds., 2013).
&
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Nondiscrimination originates from the moral theory of business ethics. 90 Unfortunately, unfair
pricing leading to the exploitation of consumers has been under-enforced because of an overly
defensive attitude towards classical price discrimination. In contrast, global platforms often
engage in dynamic price discrimination due to automated software algorithms that offer precise
information about consumers' willingness to pay. 9 1
Second, even in the absence of monetary considerations, the EC has a compelling case due
to an algorithmic 92 competitive advantage; for example, the volume of data that Google
amassed from its users. The latter enjoy no bargaining power vis-a-vis Google other than
leaving its platform. The CCI also recognized data as a competitive advantage in relation to
Google Flights' prominent display and the algorithmic demotion of rivals. 9 3 As a dominant
distribution platform, Amazon also uses its customers' data to gain a competitive edge over its
rivals in the marketplace. 9 4
In addition, the Court of Justice (hereafter CJEU) clarified in MEO that under Article 102
(c), the discriminatory conduct hinders the competitive position of a dominant undertaking's
business partners. 95 The same could be said of rival comparison-shopping services. Google
excluded rivals from its shopping unit in the absence of a direct purchase functionality. 96
One feature of the European enforcement of Article 102 (a) is the wide variety of unfair
contractual agreements beyond traditional sales, including copyright licensing for
nonperformance in GEMA, a compulsory assignment of copyrights in SABAMII, a trademark
agreement in Grunes Punkt, an unreasonable duration and automatic renewal of a commercial
lease in Tetra Pak II and Alsatel, and industrial supply. 97 One could, therefore, argue that the
Juan M. Elegido, The Ethics of PriceDiscrimination,21 BUS. ETHICS Q. 634 (2011); for price discrimination
leading to consumer welfare, see Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications ofMonopolistic ThirdDegree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 242 (1981); Marius Schwartz, Third-degree Price
Discriminationand Output: Generalizinga Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 1259 (1990); price discrimination
is worse for consumers, even if it increases efficiency for firms, see Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price
Discrimination: When Demand is a Function ofBoth Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REv. 242
(2019).
91 Oliver Hinz, II-H Hann & Martin Spann, Price Discriminationin E-commerce? An Examination of Dynamic
Pricing in Name-your-own PriceMarkets, 35 MISS. Q. 81 (2001); Nawel Ayadi, Corina Paraschiv & Xavier
Rousset, Online Dynamic Pricing and Consumer-perceived Ethicality: Synthesis and Future Research, 32
RECHERCHE & APPLICATIONS EN MARKETING 50 (2017); cf on doubting that the collection of behavioral data
favors producers, see Dirke Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, The Limits ofPrice Discrimination,
105 AM. ECON. REV. 953 (2015); cf on dynamic prices that could be justified by buyers' uncertainty, see Daniel
F. Garrett, IntertemporalPrice Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values, 106 AM. ECON. REv.
3291 (2016); however, consumer welfare declines as more information about consumers becomes available, see
Daniele Condorelli & Jorge Padilla, HarnessingPlatform Envelopment in the Digital World," 16 J. COMP. L.
EC. (2020), 164.
92 Competition & Mkt. Auth., supra note 39, at 5.23; due to limited empirical evidence, historical search data
would confer less of a competitive advantage, cf Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Search Engines and Data
Retention: Implicationsfor Privacy andAntitrust, N.B.E.R. 19 (2017); for a gap in the literature on algorithmic
fairness, discrimination, and empiricism, see Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination,86
U.C.L.R. 465 (2019).
93 CCI, supra note 11 at 294.
94 Khan, supra note 1, at 7 on Amazon's exploitation of its customers' data; for Booksellers Association's
concerns, HL, supra note 1, at 145.
95 Servigos, supra note 82 at 25.
96 Eur. Comm 'n, supra note 1 at 439.
97 Case COMP/IV/29971, GEMA, 1982 O.J. (L 94) 12; Case C-127/73 BRT v. SABAM II, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25;
Case COMP/D3/34493, Der Grner Punk Duales System Deutschland, 2001 O.J. (L 166) 1; Case
&
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scope of unfair trading is open-ended. In the absence of any negotiation with the dominant
undertaking, rival platforms have no choice but to accept standard terms and conditions. Thus,
rivals suffer a disadvantage vis-a-vis a vertically integrated platform. Furthermore, any
inclusion in a universal search must pursue fair, objective, and nondiscriminatory ranking
criteria.
In contrast, the CCI applied the statutory prohibition of unfair conditions to trademark
owners that had no choice but to bid for AdWords. As such, consumers were confused by rival
bids that were better ranked than trademark owners. 9 8 One unfair condition identified was the
contractual termination of licensing without any reason. 9 9 The practice bears striking
similarities with the Google France case and exacerbates a free-rider problem.10 0 Although a
literal interpretation of the Indian statute places unfairness in the context of sales, the CCT's
approach is appropriate for online platforms subject to one caveat; it upsets the dividing line
between competition and IP law. In addition, Google expected exclusivity from advertisers.
Otherwise, advertising for the concurrent use of rival platforms was "prohibitively

expensive."

101

The CCI did not substantiate exclusivity in Google's distribution agreements with browsers,
making Google the default option for universal searches.10 2 Google's intermediation
agreements demanded that publishers not show search engines that are "the same or
substantially similar" to those offered by Google. 103 This conduct was captured by unfair
conditions imposed on publishers. 104 As Google "marginalized" its rivals, 105 it strengthened its
dominant position, which is similar to its European counterpart. In the AdSense case, Google
prohibited publishers from placing rival ads on universal searches, insisting that they place a
minimum number of ads and prevent ads being shown in a visible spot that would attract

traffic. 106
Although in its early days, the EC's investigation into Amazon's marketplace focused on its
use and analytics of "competitively sensitive information," including pricing data about sellers'
products and their customers' preferences. 107 As the most popular online marketplace, Amazon
clashes with the neutral role of global distribution. 108 Despite limited empirical research to

COMP/IV/31043, Tetra Pak II, 1992 O.J. L 72/1; Case C-247/86, Alsatel, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469; Thompson,
supra note 89, at 10.143.
98 CCI, supra note 11 at 26, 278.
99

Id. at 325.

100

Case C-236/08, Google France & Google, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159.

101 CCI, supra note 11, at 329.
1
12 1d. at 367.
103

Id. at 374, 394, 398.

104 See cf CCI, supra note 11 at 414 (Google argued that such agreements are subject to negotiation with
publishers). Thus, publishers have a weaker bargaining power vis-a-vis Google.
105 CCI, supra note 11 at
395.

Case COMP/40411 Google Advertising (AdSense), not yet available; pending appeal Case T-334/19 Google
& Alphabet v. Comm'n, 2019 E.C.R.; Eur. Comm'n PRESS RELEASE IP/19/1770, COMMISSION FINES GOOGLE
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BILLION FOR ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN ONLINE ADVERTISING (Mar. 20, 2019).
Case COMP/AT/40462 Amazon; COMMISSION EUR. COMM'N PRESS RELEASE IP/19/4291, COMMISSION
OPENS INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT OF AMAZON (Jul. 17, 2019).
107

On Amazon's role as a marketplace and reseller versus hosting by inviting rivals to sell on top
of its offerings,
see Andrei Hagiu & Joshua Wright, Marketplace or reseller?, 61 MGMT. SCI. (2015), 184; Hagiu & Wright,
Controllingvs. enabling, 65 MGMT. SCI. (2019), 577; HARVARD BUS. SCHOOL WP 16-002 (July 2015); Hagiu,
Jullien, & Wright, Creatingplatforms by hostingrivals, 66 MGMT. SCI. (2020), 7.
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support cogent evidence of abuse, Amazon could prove a replica of Google Shopping,109 where
a distribution platform with paramount bargaining and market power prominently displays its
own brands, and through vertical foreclosure, disproportionately charges rival sellers for
inclusion or abruptly terminates contractual relations as in the German Amazon case. 1 0 The
real difference is that of degree."' In Google Shopping, users make no purchases, so the
likelihood of vertical foreclosure effects was sufficient. On Amazon's marketplace, customers
make purchases that could leave them worse off in case of reduced choice, but further evidence
of downgrading or de-listing rival sellers is required. Amazon's friendly pricing for consumers
to disguise a long-term selective predatory strategy could not be entirely excluded, where lower
prices first build customers' trust in Amazon's platform with captive customers paying higher
prices later.1 1 2
The Principle of Fairness Applicable to Combinations of Data
While Facebook has achieved a similar competitive advantage to Google based on the largescale collection of data, the HRC disagreed." 3 For any competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
Facebook's competitors, there must be an "objective impairment"' of their freedom of action.
Unlike Gegenwert I and II, the HRC emphasized that there is inconclusive evidence that
Facebook's consolidation of data is a barrier to market entry or makes entry more difficult for
rivals." 4 On closer examination, Facebook offers privileged access to Al data analytics, which
is not matched elsewhere by its rivals.
One may argue that the use of data analytics and combinations of data from other platforms
strengthened Facebook's global dominance. However, Facebook surpassed Equifax's data
protection issue," 5 and thus, Facebook's behavior cannot be captured as a "privacy-policy
tying" or "bundling of user data." 16 That terminology denotes separate services, whereas a
For Amazon's prominent display of its own products due to a secret algorithm, see Hagiu et. al., supra note
72, at 2 and 4, with Amazon more likely to compete with most successful sellers.
110 Bundeskartellamt, supra note 19 (BKartA closed its investigation against Amazon for
blocking merchants'
accounts, exclusionary terms concerning liability and for manipulation of customer reviews).
"ii Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, Competing with Complementors: An EmpiricalLook atAmazon.com, 39 STRATEGIC
MGMT J. 2632 (2018); speculative media claimed that Amazon had forced rivals to charge lower prices, Dana
Mattioli, Amazon ChangedSearchAlgorithm in Ways That Boost Its Own Products, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 16, 2019);
Amazon could exclude rivals by charging higher fees for listings, JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST
109

PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 126 (2019).
112 For predation, see Baker, supra note 111, at 137; Khan, supra note 1, at 753 criticizing recoupments as a bar
to antitrust intervention; for skepticism about a genuine predatory strategy, see CHRIS SAGERS, UNITED STATES V.

APPLE: COMPETITION IN AMERICA 232 (2019).
113 Bundeskartellamt, supra note 19 at 498; cf. Higher Reg'l Ct. of Dusseldorf, supra note 20 at 32; cf Servigos,
supra note 82 at 9 (where the Court dismissed a de minimis threshold for the seriousness of a competitive
disadvantage); on significant competitive advantage in mergers, see Salvatore De Vita & Eleonora Ocello,
Apple/Shazam: A Remix of Your FavoriteTunes ofDataIssues in Merger Control, COMP.in COMP. MERGER BRIEF
3 (2019); for a data competitive advantage (feedback loop), see Furman, supra note 23, at 33.
114 Higher Reg'l Ct. of Dusseldorf, supra note 20 at 34, 36; Ger. Sup. Ct., BGH KZR 58/11 VBL-Gegenwert I
(Judgment of Nov. 6, 2013); Ger. Sup. Ct., BGH KZR 47/14 VBL-Gegenwert 11 (Judgment of Jan., (Judgment of
Jan. 24, 2017); greater access to big data by a dominant platform may exclude rivals, exploiting data as a
competitive advantage through personalization and selective targeting of customers, see Baker, supra note 111,
at 128 and 134.
115 Wouter P.J. Wils, The Obligationfor CompetitionAuthorities of the EUMember States to Apply EUAntitrust
Law and the Facebook Decision of the Bundeskartellamt, 13 CONCURRENCES (2019); Case C-238/05, Asnef
Equifax, EULI:EU:C:2006:734, at 63.
116 See Condorelli & Padilla, Data-driven PredatoryEntry with Privacy-Policy Tying, available on SSRN (May
13, 2020); thus, better captured as a "combination of data across multiple platforms ... without infringing privacy
laws," see Condorelli & Padilla, supra note 91, at 146.

14

"personalized" experience involves a blend of big data by combining different sets of personal
data. Facebook's unique triple target has been to monetize, monopolize, and combine its users'
data across multiple platforms to obtain an unparalleled data-driven competitive advantage.
As BKartA is not responsible for consumer protection, Section 19 (2), no 2 ARC was
inapplicable." 7 This section is a general clause against unfair terms. In his economic evidence
in support of Facebook, the former chairman of the Monopolies Commission, Professor
Haucap, argued that Facebook's incorporation of users' data across several of its platforms,
including WhatsApp, Oculus, Masquerade, Instagram, and Facebook, is efficient, as it
improves the quality of Facebook's targeted advertising. 1 8 This position can be rebutted for
three reasons. First, national consumer protection authorities in the EU do not necessarily deal
with privacy breaches, as in the US. 119 Second, the general clause relates to the unfair conduct
of a dominant undertaking, which requires a careful distinction between Section 19's unfair
business terms and conditions and unfair contractualterms. Regardless of whether targeted
advertising is beneficial, one should also examine the privacy angle rather than efficiency
alone. Third, compared to a data protection authority, BKartA can better perform an economic
analysis of Facebook's super-dominance. The Federation of Consumer Associations has
welcomed this development. 120 In contrast, the HRC was overcritical of the Facebookdecision.
The latter is a test case of whether competition could extend its application to Al data-driven
global platforms. The HRC did not follow the spirit of a flexible approach to digital markets,
as advanced by Schweitzer, Haucap, Kerber, and Welker, as it considered unfair business terms
as a matter of contract law. 121
The legal context of the German provision in question refers to a dominant undertaking's
imposition of "business terms and conditions" that are dissimilar to those applicable under the
conditions of effective competition, and, where possible, comparable markets. The BKartA
applied Section 19 (1), no 2 to Facebook's abuse of a dominant position through abusive
business terms and conditions. 122 The latter enabled Facebook to amass users' data-without
their consent-across several platforms owned by Facebook. 123 Such terms include cookies to
"? Federal O.J. I-1750, Jun. 26, 2013, as later amended Jun. 1, 2017; BKartA, at 156; cf. for business practices,
unfair competition (Section 3 (1) & 4 (10) of the Unfair Competition Law) intersects competition law (Section 19
of the Act against Restraints), so the former applies to individual claims from competitors and to market

obstruction,

generally HELMUTH KOHLER & JOACHIM BORNHAM, GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN
WETTBEWERB 101, at 6.17 (2011); for a brief review, ANCA D. CHIRITA, THE GERMAN AND ROMANIAN ABUSE
OF MARKET DOMINANCE IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE 102 142-3 (2011).
118 BKartA, supra note 14 at 163; cf beyond conglomerate mergers' contribution to economies of scale, data
combinations could expand dominance, see JACQUES CREMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE

SCHWEITZER, COMMISSION FINAL REPORT: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA 108 (2019).

Most eloquently, CMA: privacy can play a role in competition and consumer law enforcement where
competition is driven by privacy, in the presence of an unfaircommercial practice or term, see WRITTEN EVIDENCE
119

(IRNO100)

TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS' SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS, THE INTERNET: To REGULATE

OR NOT TO REGULATE, at 57 (2018); for the view that antitrust should not embed privacy concerns but strengthen
privacy laws, see D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust's 'Curse ofBigness' Problem, 118 MICH. L. REV. (2020) 22.
120 BKartA, supra note 14 at 966; cf HRC, supra note 20 at 28.
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https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Studien/modernisierung-der-missbmuchsaufsicht-fuermarktmaechtige-untemehmen-zusammenfassung-englisch.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=3; at 11 for a duty to
share data; cf Commissioner Rosch that such a duty could discourage innovation, supra note 121, at 6.
122 BKartA, supra note 14 at 559, 561, where Facebook's terns of service in conjunction with its data and cookies
policies are terns and conditions within the meaning of section 19; cf. Facebook's claims that the legal basis is
data protection, at 566.
123 Id. at 522.
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allow online retailers to recognize a returning customer and match their browsing history,
previous purchases, and delivery location. The latter is indicative of the average market value
of their houses and their income."'
Facebook's terms and conditions are standard terms. As Facebook users cannot negotiate
such terms, they are unilaterally imposed on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.12 The SC agreed that
the ease with which users accept Facebook's standard terms is a formal manifestation of
information asymmetries and consumers' indifference.12 6 Furthermore, for an abuse of
dominance, such terms are not required to be illegal. 127
This author argues that even if users consent to Facebook's policies, consent could still be
meaningless. Otherwise, through mechanical box-ticking, Facebook could record voluntary
consent and remain safe from any intervention by data protection laws, as the latter cannot
challenge the abuse of a dominant position through exploitative data consolidationfollowing
mergers and acquisitions (ex-post). 128
Similar to the imposition of unacceptable contractual conditions by a dominant undertaking,
the SC held that Facebook's product extension could harm competition, which requires
protection under the Act against Restraints. 1 29 As in the Oberhammer case on forced
contractual tying, harmful effects can arise if the imposition of a product extension exploits
customers or threatens competition.1 30 Contrary to the HRC's view, the SC stressed that the
behavior of a dominant undertaking imposing unacceptable conditions on its customers could,
nonetheless, be abusive even though that behavior did not lead to their exploitation.13 1
Therefore, one cannot deny the applicability of Section 19 (1) to the present scenario, as, under
effective competition, the harmful effects on consumers would not have occurred. 132 This
happens in dual-sided markets, where the exploitation of intermediaries on one side of the
market could also harm competition on the other side of the market.13 3 Therefore, the SC
dismissed Facebook's claim that the prohibition of data mining and processing without consent
was a data protection measure only, but recognized BKartA's empowerment under Section 32
(2), no 1 ARC." In this section, BKartA may undertake behavioral or structural remedies to
address Facebook's behavior. Furthermore, the SC dismissed Facebook's claim against
BKartA's decision to be primarily based on a violation of data protection as regards to
For excellent insights, Arupratan Daripa & Sandeep Kapur, Pricing on the Internet, 17 OXFORD REV. EC.
POL'Y 209 (2001).
125 On the birth of competition from contract law, STEPHEN A. SMITH, ATIYAH'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 12 (2005): "Competition has even been given as a solution to the problem that contracting parties
often do not understand or even read ... complex contractual terms"; similarly, Hugh Beale, Legislative Control
of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT
LAW 232 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995): "even if a customer is aware of what is in the standard
term and protests, it is likely to be met with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude."
126 SC, supra note 13 at 91.
124
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For a lack of competence of data-protection authorities for an abusive exploitation of data by monopolists, and
especially following M&As, see Chirita, supra note 1, at 111; on under-enforcement, CMA's CHIEF EXECUTIVE,
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Facebook's terms of use and reiterated that Facebook's abuse consists of a lack of genuine or
free choice of users to deny or withdraw consent for their data without harm.1 "I This is a longawaited, outstanding victory for consumers' freedom of choice.
The Mechanics of a Tripartite System and Its Enforcement Gap
In recent years, a lacuna in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679 has
been acknowledged by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).136 Accordingly, users
may become locked into a platform because of the time and effort to switch to an alternative
provider. An exploitative abuse could consist of the price paid for the data entrusted to such
platforms, which could, in turn, become excessive compared to the value of the service itself.
Most importantly, the principle of fairness permeates consumer contracts, competition, and
data protection legislation on unfair terms; Article 102 (2) (a)'s imposition by a monopolist of
unfair trading conditions and unfair data processing, respectively.
Due to the mechanics of a tripartite enforcement system, this author argues that this mix of
regulatory powers over unfair terms becomes a vicious circle. This can only occur when the
competition authorities leave the issue of exploitative abuse of consumers to the consumer
protection authorities, while the latter leaves the issue of unfair terms to data protection
authorities. In Facebook, BKartA had been in close coordination with the data protection
authority, which agreed that BKartA should take the matter in its remit. This is consistent with
the EDPS's concerns1 37 about grounds for intervention under data protection, consumer
protection, and competition laws to address potential negative implications of micro-targeting
for individuals' fundamental rights.
This article argues that BKartA's assessment is legally sound. Neither the GDPR 138 nor civil
contracts, for example, individual liability for unfair terms, can address Facebook's unfair
business terms and conditions, especially its exploitative use of Al data. The European
counterpart prohibition of unfair trading under Article 102 (a) does not exclude the application
of more severe provisions of national competition law. 13 9 Furthermore, a national intervention
under the Act against Unfair Competition 14 0 applies to cases of the abuse of relative bargaining
power. Thus, Facebook enjoys a quasi-monopolistic, superior bargaining position. 14 1
On appeal, the HRC dismissed the claim of an exploitative abuse under Section 19 (2), no
2. In the HRC's view, this section applies exclusively to the sale of goods or services for which
1 35

Id. at 131.

Vestager's Answer P-001183/2019 given to Parliament on behalf of the Commission (May 8, 2019) that the
GDPR 2016/679 closes an enforcement gap; for a nuanced opinion that online price discrimination could fall
under the GDPR, and thus the latter cannot be applicable to all cases and remains silent on the lawfulness of price
discrimination, Richard Steppe, Online Price Discrimination and Personal Data: A General Data Protection
Regulation Perspective, 33 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 773, 776 (2017); cf initially, EDPS, PRELIMINARY
136

OPINION: PRIVACY AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DATA PROTECTION,
COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 29, para 4.2 (Mar. 2014); EDPS,
OPINION 8/2016 ON COHERENT ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 8 (Sep. 23,

2016).
13
7 BKartA, supranote 14 at 555; EDPS, OPINION 8/2016, at 9; EDPS, OPINION 3/20 18 ON ONLINE MANIPULATION
AND PERSONAL DATA 17 (Mar. 19, 2018).
138 Cf BKartA, supra note 14 at 536 and
540.
139 Eilmansberger, supra note 89, at 2.15.231; on unfair terms, de la Mano, supra
note 89, at 516.
140 BKartA, supra note 14 at 540, 544 where BKartA could have clarified why the Unfair
Competition Act does
not
apply
to
Facebook
and
the
data-protection
loophole
for
abuse
of
a
dominant
position.
14 11d.
at 646, 784, and 786 on Facebook's clear imbalance vis-a-vis users, especially the young and inexperienced.
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a dominant undertaking demands payment or other terms and conditions. The latter are
different from those that would ordinarily arise under effective competition. In particular, the
HRC criticized BKartA for not having assessed competition in comparable markets. This author
argues that following an ordo-liberal mantra of as-if-competition1 42 is unpalatable as BKartA
had, indeed, examined social media markets comparable with Facebook. Thus, such an analysis
is irrelevant in the absence of an unfair price. However, consumers rarely pay for the use of
social media services other than their data. Therefore, it is unclear why the HRC referred to
Facebook's business terms, including data and cookie, as directives instead of a notice or
privacy policy. However, the SC disagreed with Facebook's claim of a global advertising
market, instead of a national market for social media. 143
Global Behavioral Discrimination
The HRC did not completely dismiss the idea that consumer harm could amount to a
distortion of competition, and as such, competition law could incorporate a consumerprotection function 14 4 following EU case law. Furthermore, under Section 19 (2), no 2,
especially on price discrimination, prices or other terms and conditions have only rarely been
found to be unfair without an analysis of "as-if-competition" in comparable markets. That said,
the as-if-competition standard requires a comparison with the conditions that would exist under
natural competition. In classical economics, Alfred Marshall warned against this
misunderstanding, saying that "only those economic results are normal, which are due to the
undisturbed action of free competition."145 The latter is an ideal model of perfectly free
competition whose natural conditions do not exist in reality. From this, it follows that BKartA
was expected to investigate whether the combination of Facebook's data with the data acquired
from other platforms falling under Facebook's ownership, such as Instagram, WhatsApp,
Masquerade, and Oculus, harmed competition in comparable markets by examining inexistent
comparable prices. 146 The SC formidably identified this non-existent market price tag to
combine users' data from third-party sources as the culprit for the HRC's denial of an
exploitative abuse through excessive disclosure of personal data. 14 7
This article had previously argued against behavioral discrimination by global platforms
such as Facebook, which are heavily reliant on their users' combination of data. Therefore, this
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HRC, supra note 20 at 7; Daniel Zimmer, Section 19 GWB, in KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN
KARTELLRECHT,
at 8 (Ulrich Immenga & Erst-Joachim Mestmacker eds., 2007); for a historical evolution of this concept and the
judicial difficulty with a hypothetical competitive price, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 252, 311 (1998).
143

SC, supra note 13 at 20. For users, Facebook is not interchangeable with platforms for professional networking

or jobs (such as Xing, LinkedIn, Indeed, or Stepstone); communications (Snapchat, WhatsApp, or Skype); or
social media (YouTube, Twitter, or Pinterest), see at 25 and 41; for an earlier view that Facebook's dual-sided
market nature will be unhelpful to a swift antitrust focus from social networking to advertising, see Dina
Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist's Journey Towards Pervasive Surveillance in
Spite of Consumers'Preferencesfor Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. (2019), 86.
144 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche, at 125 does not mention consumers but discusses a system ensuring that
competition is not distorted; cf. HRC, supra note 20 at 8 refers to the consumer-protection function, at 125.
15 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 29 (2013).

Indeed, one cannot determine the economic value of data as for tangible products or services, see Nicholas
Economides & Ioannis Lianos, NET INSTITUTE WP 20-05, J. COMP. L. & EC. (2020), 40; cf that such an
insurmountable step would be necessary, see Viktoria Robertson, Excessive Data Collection: Privacy
ConsiderationsandAbuse of Dominance in the Era of Big Data, 57 C. M. L. REv. (2020), 161.
147 SC, supra note 13 at 9; also, at 85, where a considerable number of users are against the disclosure of personal
data.
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behavior cannot be treated in the same way as classic second-degree price discrimination.14 8
Of course, one would have expected the HRC to adopt a more flexible approach to the as-ifcompetition standard. Fortunately, the SC came to its rescue by upholding that the above
Section 19 (2) is not subject to a stricter "as-if' standard, which is limited and even
inappropriate in situations where there is no prospect of effective competition. 14 9
Due to the sharing of users' data, which is free of charge and impossible to compare,
behavioral discrimination is, nonetheless, close to a contemporary interpretation of third15 0 This is where Facebook or third-party analytics can identify
degree discrimination.
categories of users with a different willingness to pay and subsequently divide them based on
economic preferences, interests, geo-location, and reservation price. Retrospectively, one could
argue that the EU enforcement against unfair pricing has not been very successful when
considering the difficulties associated with a price-cost analysis of comparable products or
services."' Comparatively, the US Robinson-Patman Act (1936) has not been enforced since
1977 due to similar expectations of price comparisons for like products.1 2 Again, the SC's
bold recognition is a huge step in the right direction.
An Intuitively Speculative Theory of Consumer Harm Through Combinations of Data
The HRC unacceptably asserted that Facebook did not exploit users because any further
combination of data could have easily been duplicated. Consumers were not worse-off but free
to share such data with third parties and Facebook's competitors." As the constitutional right
to privacy must be safeguarded, it appears nonsensical to encourage users to share their data
with everyone.
The HRC criticized BKartA for the lack of "meaningful" findings of the combination of
data.15 4 This suggests that such a combination did not amount to an "excessive" disclosure of
data. This criticism is not waterproof because users share various types of relevant data with
other platforms, but BKartA noted this.
This author argues that the sole large combination of data offers Facebook a unique
competitive advantage vis-a-vis its competitors. With its ownership of Instagram, WhatsApp,
Masquerade, and Oculus, Facebook could only enrich the type of relevant data available in its
possession and share it with third parties for both advertising and analytics. Unreasonably, the
HRC expected BKartA to find the market value of such data, contrary to the view" cited by
the HRC, which is indeed difficult to quantify. However, Korber's argument that there is no
exploitative abuse because Facebook's combination of data improves the quality of its service
and because users suffer no detriment is incorrect for two reasons. First, it is unclear how users'
For Pigou's classical definition of price discrimination, A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE
279 (2013),
namely (i) first degree, if a monopolist charges a different price against all different product units; (ii) second
degree, if it were able to charge different prices; and (iii) third degree, if the monopolist were to distinguish
amongst groups of customers. In favor of a ban on price discrimination, see John Vickers, Regulation,
Competition, and the Structure of Prices, 13 OXFORD REv. Ec. POL'Y 22 (1997); cf. the welfare consequences of
price discrimination in monopoly markets are ambiguous, Baker, supra note 111, at 133.
148
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"1 Eilmansberger, supra note 89, at 2.15.205.
152 HOVENKAMP, supra note 150, at
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behavior, rather than technical data, could improve the social network's engine. Second, it is
very doubtful that Facebook users have suffered no detriment where third parties have analyzed
their economic preferences and location data to make predictions about the reservation price
and willingness to buy.
Unfortunately, the HRC's judgment relied on the speculative assumption that there is no
exploitative abuse by acquiring users' data by third-party companies because the users were
neither harmed nor exploited. 15 6 Instead, the HRC favored proof that Facebook's terms were
different from those arising under effective competition. However, this bar is ludicrous, as
Facebook's market shares and acquisitions of other platforms demonstrate that there is no
effective competition. It is tantamount to agree that if Facebook's competitors offer similar
terms and conditions, sharing such data combinations with third-party analytics makes
Facebook's conduct pro-competitive.
The analogy with the VBL-Gegenwert cases of civil liability for unfair terms illustrates the
SC's application to data processing.1 " As in Gegenwert II, where the SC did not examine
whether competitors were using similar terms and conditions, BKartA recognized that
Facebook would compete less effectively with Google if it did not rely on its users' data.15 8
Contrary to the HRC, the SC followed BKartA's approach, which did not dismiss an
infringement of competition law, as users have not expressly consented to the collection,
processing, and combination of their data. 159
Perhaps, one may agree with the HRC that the legal interpretation in the Facebook decision
was not highly persuasive. 16 0 On substance, both the decision and the HRC ruling leave much
to be desired. In the words of Einstein, "Only daring speculation can lead us further and not
the accumulation of facts." The latter is prevalent throughout, while legal interpretation holds
certain flaws. The HRC was unprepared to accept what it had perceived to be a speculative
consumer harm theory based on global platforms' combination of data. There was no empathy
towards contractual unfairness, even when a monopolistic platform caused it.
Consideration of Fundamental Human Rights Such as Privacy in the Public Interest
Both the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the German Constitution require that an
assessment of unfair terms and conditions follows the hierarchy of laws: privacy is a
fundamental human right, and subsequently, it is above other norms. 16 1 Following the
Pechstein ruling, the assessment of the parties' interests must consider constitutionally
protected rights, such as individual autonomy against commercial interests. 162 In Pechstein, the
SC stated that when examining the relevant interests under Section 19, one must consider
156 SC, supra note 13 at 9.
15. BKartA, supra note 14, at 523-4.
158 Id. at 874,881; SC, BGH, Jan. 24, 2017, KZR 47/14, juris (Ger.) http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&n=7783 3&pos=0&anz=1.
159 SC, supra note 13 at 129; also, at 130 on Facebook's lack of express consent for
combinations of data.
160 BKartA, supra note 14, at 525; HRC, supra note
20 at 9.
161 BKartA, supra note 14, at 526, 529 on the right to informational self-determination; cf
skeptical that privacy
could overcome surveillance credited to national security but for corporate data tracking; see Benjamin W.
Cramer, A Proposalto Adopt DataDiscriminationRather Than Privacy as the Justificationfor RollingBack Data
Surveillance, 8 J. INFORMATION POL'Y 28 (2018).
162
BKartA, supra note 14, at 527-8, 900; SC, BGH, Jun. 7, 2016, KZR 6/15, juris (Ger.)
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=75021&pos=0&anz=1, at 56 on heteronomy where
general clauses of civil (Section 138) and competition law (Section 19) must take fundamental rights into account.
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fundamental rights such as the freedom to exercise a profession. 163 In Facebook, the SC held
that whether a dominant position is abusive depends upon an overall assessment of the relevant
interests with regard to the ARC's goal of free competition. 164 Although undertakings decide
the nature of their economic activity, the freedom to design their business model exists solely
within the ARC limits. 165 In other words, this entrepreneurial freedom cannot lead to the abuse
or a restriction of competition, which runs counter to the goal of "free competition."166 As users
deserve protection due to their increasing dependence on Facebook, the SC agreed with
BKartA's findings of anticompetitive effects, which justify a restriction of entrepreneurial
freedom. Where the freedom of choice has been weakened, due to Facebook's paramount
position and lock-in effects, and, as a result of actual or residual competition, consumers are
disempowered from implementing their preferences, the prohibition of abuse under Section 19
(1) requires consumer choice to be considered when examining all relevant interests. 167
Comparatively, the English test of reasonableness evaluates an imbalance of bargaining
power. There is a gross imbalance of bargaining power 168 between Facebook and its users.
Facebook unilaterally dictates business terms to users. Therefore, adopting a paternalistic
approach to this context could correct the issues of asymmetric market power. 169 In the same
spirit, the Federation of Consumer Associations recognized data policies as standard business
terms. 170

There are striking similarities with the transparency requirement for drafting contracts
where such terms have to be intelligible, easily accessible, and written in clear and plain
language. 171 Therefore, one cannot agree with the outdated way of thinking expressed by the
HRC, that is, that the average Facebook user behaves rationally. It assumed that users had
autonomously controlled such data combinations with their consent, as users had not been
unfairly "coerced," "pressured," or subjected to external constraints. 172 Regarding the latter,
one may agree with both the HRC and K5rber 173 that this is not the case. However, this is an
incredibly low bar for intervention in unfair contracts, especially where a powerful party forces
the weaker party to agree to data combinations. It is unacceptable and inapplicable to Facebook.
Fortunately, the SC recognized that users expect their data collection and processing to be
limited for Facebook's funding, and not inclusive of third-party data. Contrary to HRC, users
should autonomously make their decisions about using the network according to their personal
preferences and moral concepts. 17 4 In the absence of a suitable alternative to Facebook's
service, users make no autonomous decisions unless one can relinquish Facebook's
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BKartA, supra note 14, at 861; gross imbalance comes at the expense of users' self-determination; dominant
platforms enjoy strong bargaining power over users and could impose unfair terms; Furman, supra note 23, at 36.
169 BKartA, supra note 14, at 530; cf Facebook objected to the applicability of unfair terms and data processing,
at 533.
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1Id. at 534, 625 for BKartA's reference to standardclauses unilaterally imposed.
17 Id. at 568 for transparency under Art. 307 (1) no 2 Civil Code; according to Art 4 (2) of the Dir. 93/13/EEC on
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 unfairness cannot touch upon monetary consideration
in so far as terms are written in plain, intelligible language.
172 HRC, supra note 20 at 9, 25.
173 Kdrber, supra note 25, at
187.
174 SC, supra note 13 at
100.
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indispensability. 175 Interestingly, the SC considered that users deserve protection from
exploitation even when a dominant undertaking does not offer essential products or services. 17 6
Relying on the constitutionally safeguarded right to "informational self-determination"' in the
context of the considerable political, social, and economic importance of Internet
communications, especially due to the size and depth of data, the SC afforded users protection
from Facebook's exploitative abuse through an undue disclosure of data. 17 7 This offers
individuals the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the context
and how their data are used. 178 More recently, the German Constitutional Court applied the
right to informational self-determination for public security purposes to protect the privacy of
Internet telecommunications subscribers, especially their dynamic IP address and traffic
data. 179 Otherwise, by matching a dynamic IP address, online movements can be traced back
to a specific point in time.
The SC stressed that the right to informational self-determination had been significantly
affected, where a dominant undertaking such as Facebook has disproportionately capitalized
on its unlimited access to users' data, both from within and outside of the social network for
the sole purpose of commercialization. 18 0 However, Facebook's collection and processing of
personal data outside of its network has not been of public interest as required by the data
protection laws, nor is it necessary to protect an individual's life or vital interests.1 81
Facebook's interest in the collection and processing of third-party data has primarily been for
targeted advertising, analysis and research, financial, security, and legal reasons.1 1 2 Although
the above interests are legitimate, especially third-party data processing for advertising
purposes, exceptions from data protection must be strictly limited.1 83
The SC did not agree that Facebook's legitimate interests cannot be adequately protected
without collecting data from outside of its platform.1 84 Facebook's abusive behavior has
harmful effects on potential competitors that would not have arisen under effective
competition."' Although potential competitors are not protected from such effects when
weighing up the above interests, there are special market conditions that leave users no real
choice between a personalized experience and excessive data processing. 186 Furthermore, the
SC disagreed with the HRC's earlier finding that a horizontal impediment to competition-visa-vis Facebook's competitors- would not depend on a lack of user consent for data processing
purposes. 18 7 Due to Facebook's paramount market position, users deserve the free choice
between a more personalized experience and one for which the collection and processing of
"off-Facebook" data, which has not been subject to users' express consent, is dispensable.1 8 8
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However, the SC found that processing off-Facebook data was not justifiable for security
reasons. 189
Irrational Consumers?
This article argues that HRC's assumption that there is no unfair exploitation of users'
weaknesses to leave the popular platform is flawed. The HRC criticized BKartA's lack of
statistical evidence that, once Facebook had changed its terms, it had massively lost users. On
the contrary, the HRC simply assumed that most users behave as rational consumers, making
autonomous decisions as they are not on Facebook (50 million), 190 leaving the other 32 million
to remain on Facebook at their peril. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the SC
dismissed this assumption as not being a valid argument to deny Facebook's abusive
behavior. 191 For example, the HRC suggested that BKartA did not prove that the "average" user
would prefer paying for the use of Facebook rather than supplying data for advertising. 192 In
contrast, the SC recognized the interest of users in remaining on Facebook and their legitimate
expectation of having a limited collection and processing of data that solely benefits
Facebook. 193 The SC criticized Facebook's additional offering of a personalized experience as
something that users did not wish, especially the acquisition of their data from third-party
sources, and for which they did not even grant access. It was questionable whether this was a
tie-in of two separate products or solely a product enhancement. The SC opted for the latter as,
in addition to social networking, users did not receive an indispensable personalized
experience.194

Contrary to the HRC's view, the SC stated that one cannot dismiss the examination of
Facebook's abuse of dominance through the imposition of a product enhancement solely
because such a personalized experience was free of charge. 195 Furthermore, the SC stressed
that by imposing a product enhancement, which is not even worth pursuing, Facebook abused
its dominant position because of the disadvantages brought about to users who do not wish
their data to be accessed for a personalized experience and because of the latter's adverse
effects on users. By examining all the circumstances of the case, an outstanding competition
concern was the increase in the consideration paid by users for Facebook's unwantedproduct
enhancement, as their data had been collected outside of users' desired social networking
service. 196
The HRC ultimately blamed 32 million users for their indifference to and failure to take
notice of Facebook's terms and conditions. 197 This is despite evidence to the contrary; for
189
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example, a user survey showed that four-fifths or, according to the SC, 80% of users did not
read Facebook's standard terms. 198 It is astonishing to say that nearly a third of this population
is elderly or too young for Facebook. However, the HRC was not interested in demographics.
Instead, it regarded concerns over Facebook's combination of sensitive data, 199 including
political views, as meaningless.
In summary, the above legal arguments put the HRC on a collision course with the approach
adopted by the EC in the historic Microsoft case, while the SC adopted a paternalistic approach
benefitting several million users. Overall, the average user did not behave rationally due to
users' inertia, being locked in the default version of Microsoft's Media Player and Explorer. In
contrast, the HRC dismissed the idea that users are dependent on Facebook when they agree to
the standard terms of service. 2 00 As the issue of sensitive data falls under data protection laws,
BKartA had previously consulted with the relevant authority. Nevertheless, the latter is unable
to evaluate Facebook's paramount economic power.
Summary of Findings
The EC concluded that Google did not compete on the merits of its service alone; it
undermined the market's competitive structure. 2 0 1 Google's prominent display and position
vis-a-vis comparison-shopping services was a defensive measure intended to protect its
revenues derived from advertising. 2 02 Rival services were unable to attract users to their
platforms, as it was necessary to compete with Google effectively. Similarly, the CCI
concluded that before 2010, relevance alone was not the hallmark of Google's universal search
results. 203 In other words, it was not "competition on the merits".
In its defense, Google criticized the imposition of a "duty to promote competition" and
disputed that access to its universal search was "indispensable"' for it to compete. 204 However,
in Google Shopping, the EC did not rely on the earlier case law on refusals. Google's universal
search was not an indispensable facility, especially given its replicability by Bing and others.2 0

198 HRC, supra note 20 at 30; cf. HL, supra note 1, at 237 (online platforms' privacy notices are inaccessible to
the average consumer being "too long and expressed in complex language"); SC, supra note 13 at 91.
199 For risks involved in the collection of sensitive social data, for example, bias and negative stereotypes, Betsy
A. Williams, Catherine F. Brooks & Yotam Shmargad, How Algorithms Discriminateon the Basis ofData They
Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications, 8 J. INFORMATION POL'Y 106 (2018).
200 HRC, supra note 20 at
25.
201 EC, supra note 7 at 600; See also, CCI, supra note 11 at 171, (suggesting that search
is not determined by
relevance).
202 EC, supra note 7 at 642.
203 CCI, supra note 11 at 420 (a).
204 EC, supra note 7 at 645; T-612/17, Google & Alphabet v. Comm'n., 2017 http://curia.europa.eu
37 (pending
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DEBATE 9 (2015) (arguing that self-favoring can only exist where universal search is an essential facility, which
contradicts the EU case law, and that comparison-shopping websites could viably attract traffic from Bing, Yahoo,
social media, and traditional advertising, which is impossible given Google's super-dominance). On substance,
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the market price and drive competitors out of the market.
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Nazzini, supra note 69 (in favor of a constructive refusal to supply which contradicts the EU case law and lack of
a contractual obligation between Google and rivals).
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Furthermore, paragraph 649 reiterated that Google's anticompetitive conduct does not stand
for novel abuse. In addition, the EC chose not to frame the conduct under preexisting forms of
abuse under Article 102 (a) or (c). In contrast to the Microsoft case, the EC divided its
enforcement against Google into three separate decisions: Comparison Shopping, Android
(tying), and AdSense (advertising). 206 While this could be commended for pragmatism, one
may raise transparency issues due to the administrative delay in granting access to the other
two cases to protect Google's business secrets.
The BKartA's concluded that Facebook users could not determine how their data had been
misused. 207 However, more ambitious is the finding that Facebook engaged in detailed
profiling of a large volume of user data for personalized and targeted advertising. 2 08
Nonetheless, although users might have eventually consented to advertising, they could not
have been assumed to have also given consent to their data being consolidated into Facebook's
sole ownership. 209
The Standard of Proof: Actual or Likely Effects on Competition?
Once more, the requisite legal standard for demonstrating that Google's conduct was
anticompetitive enters a controversial territory. Whether it was restrictive of competition, or if
it was capable of having, or likely to have had an anticompetitive effect (Google made market
access more difficult or impossible) followed the Post-Denmark I ruling. 2 10 Accordingly,
Google's conduct should be objectively necessary, or its exclusionary effects are outweighed
by efficiency gains that also benefit users.
Post-DenmarkII makes it unnecessary to prove that Google's conduct has actual effects in
concrete terms, where rival comparison-shopping services stop trading. 211 The same standard
can be derived from MEO, where the CJEUmadeit clear that there is no need for an additional
proof of an "actual, quantifiable deterioration in the competitive position of the business
partners taken individually." 2 12 It is necessary to examine whether price discrimination
"produces or is capable of producing" a competitive disadvantage. This is in line with the
earlier standard of actual or probable effects. The SC followed the same approach when
applying Section 19 (2), no 1 for which it is unnecessary to prove actual effects. 213
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208
Id. at 598, 627, and 655 where opt-out does not prevent the combination of data; cf Id. at 616 (data protection
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209 BKartA, supra note 14 at 655.
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211 EC, supra note 7 at 602 referring to C-23/14, Post Danmark v. Konkurrenceradet, 2015 E.C.R. II-66 that "the
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Online Markets, COMP. POL'Y INT. (2017) (on how the hypothesis of probable effects is ill-suited for digital
markets).
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It was sufficient to establish an exclusionary effect on comparison-shopping services that
are as efficient as Google Shopping, as in Intel and MEO.214 The CCI also adopted a version
of this as an efficient competitor test. The investigation report initially found that, due to
reduced visibility, equally efficient search-service providers could not attract enough users.
However, a minimum efficiency level was necessary to compete effectively with Google and
survive competitive pressure without rivals leaving the market. 215
Practitioners, especially those defending Google or Alphabet, would like to stymie the above
rule of evidence and push for actual rather than probable anticompetitive effects. For their
purposes, such a move would be beneficial. It would ask the EU Courts to seek evidence that
following the implementation of a different ranking algorithm, traffic to comparison-shopping
websites had decreased and that they had exited the market or that Google had removed rival
websites from its index. 2 16 In and of itself, that would be an extremely high bar for intervention
and would not be in the spirit of prevention. It would ask competition authorities to contemplate
doing nothing until Google's rivals have exited the market. What is precisely the point of an
actual exit if, on a balance of all probabilities, the likelihood is that alternative websites receive
no traffic at all? According to Aristotle, "probable impossibilities" are better than improbable
possibilities.
In Facebook, the HRC also attempted to impose a higher bar for competition intervention
when arguing that, for an exploitative abuse under Section 19 (2), no 2, the BKartA had to
prove it was "highly" likely that Facebook's terms were different than they would have been
under effective competition. 217 On the contrary, the SC held that under Section 19 (1), market
conditions could be adversely affected even in the absence of a higher likelihood, as required
under Section 19 (2).218 Furthermore, the objective capability to produce adverse effects cannot
be denied based on direct network effects. 2 19 Ultimately, this capability is given by the quality
and quantity of the users' data and, due to the dual-sided nature of the market, the behavioral
effects on both markets must be considered together rather than in isolation. 220 As a result, the
chances of both actual and potential competitors are lowered. 22 1 However, even good access to
data cannot compensate for the lack of adequate direct network effects.22 2 One cannot deny the
existence of negative effects on the advertising market. Contrary to HRC, the SC held that there
is no need to establish a separate market for advertising. 223 This follows an earlier case law that
found negative effects on non-dominant, tertiary markets. 22 4
The US Theory of Leveraging and its EU Transplant
The EC has demonstrated that Google used dedicated algorithms such as Panda to
"automatically demote" competing websites and, in turn, to ensure its Shopping Unit and

C-413/14, P Intel v. Comm'n, 2017 E.C.R. I-132; Servigos, supra note 82 at 31 (on a dominant undertaking's
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1Id. at 81.
2 19
_d. at 93.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 94.
222 _[d. at 95.
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website acquired the lost traffic. 22 5 Google did so with the sole intention of expanding its
universal-search dominance over comparison shopping. Widely known as leveraging, this
theory has been transplanted in several jurisdictions, most notably Facebook and Google.226 In
Griffith, ParamountPictures (1948) and Eastman Kodak (1980), the US forbade the use of
monopoly power in a primary market to acquire a competitive advantage in a secondary market,
especially in cases of vertical integration, such as Google's Shopping Unit, obtaining an unfair
advantage over rivals in the comparison-shopping market. 227 However, the Ninth Circuit
subsequently rejected this in Alaska Airlines (1991), as US dicta in Spectrum Sports (1993),
where leveraging had to actually monopolize or dangerously threaten to do so and, finally, in
Trinko (2004).
By contrast, one could argue that, although the EU approach is harsher than its US
counterpart, a strategy of leveraging by vertically integrated platforms could be successfully
devised to expand dominance from one digital market to another while having long-term
exclusionary effects on the latter market. 22 8 This strategy becomes dangerous where dominance
is strengthened by mergers with innovative firms having no other commonality than the
exploitation of a large-scale combination of data as a conglomerate competitive advantage over
rivals. The historical context of multiple acquisitions by Google, Facebook, and others means
that strategic leveraging is no longer pro-competitive. 229
Thus, in Google, traffic was essential to improve the relevance of a search engine. 230 The
EC arrived at this conclusion by applying a behavioral economics analysis of users' inertia,
where their attention focused on the "first three to five" search results shown on the first
page. 2 31 Indeed, it would be implausible for an average user to act as a careful and diligent
researcher. It would expect users to be mindful of unconscious bias because they believe that
the results would ordinarily be ranked based on relevance alone: whichever result appears
higher would also be the most relevant for their search. 232 In addition, the Commission relied
on user surveys and analyses of traffic data.2 33 Consequently, the traffic to rival comparisonshopping websites recorded a lasting decline. 23 4
22 5

1d. at 348, 379, 420, 452, and 514 (for Google, its shopping unit and website are a single service experience).

On leveraging, EC, supra note 7 at 386; CCI, supra note 11 at 248; CBC, supra note 9, at 3 (Google was able
to leverage data to improve its product and attract more users); Google Shopping in Brazil, supra note 3; BKartA,
supra note 14 at 747 and 887-8; MARGRETHE VESTAGER, Executive Vice President, SPEECH: FAIR MARKETS IN
A DIGITAL WORLD 5 (Mar. 9, 2018); Furman, supra note 23, at 58 (platforms give preferential treatment to their
own products to extend their position into associated markets); WALDMAN, supra note 197, at 87 (with suggestions
for a code of conduct; data leveraging causes unfair discrimination against users and abuse of their trust).
226

227

HERBERT HOENKAMP, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST CONCISE 294 (2017); HOVENKAMP, supra note 150, at 426;
EINER ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 358 (2018), (Monopolistic leveraging could

be successful if monopoly power was leveraged to acquire or maintain monopoly power in another market).
228 For an approach to leveraging that makes self-preferencing subject to an effects test, see CREMER, supra note
118, at 7, 66; on a systematic strategy, 37; vertically integrated platforms could inhibit rivals, Ezrachi & Stucke
in HL, supra note 1, at 144.
229 On acquisitions of smaller firms by Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, see ANCA D CHIRITA, WRITTEN
EVIDENCE TO THE HM TREASURY'S DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL 12 (Dec. 2019),

https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785548/DCEP
Anca D. Chirita, Data-Driven Mergers under

_Public-responses_tocallfor_evidence_from_individuals.pdf;

EU Competition Law, in THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL LAW: WAYS FORWARD FOR CHANGE AND REFORM 147-

83 (Orkun Akseli & John Linarelli eds., 2020).
230 EC, supra note 7 at 447.
23 1
Id. at 453, 455, and 535.
232
_d. at 598.
233
Id. at 437, 518 (2), and 615.
23 4
Id. at 479, 481, and 496.
27

How could websites compete and then recover such lost traffic? One alternative was to
increase the spending on advertising. However, this was not economically viable. 235 In
addition, users are disinclined to look at ads. 236 The findings are based on Google's conduct,
which has the potential to foreclose rival comparison-shopping websites as they cannot recover
the lost traffic. In the long run, they have no other choice than ceasing to offer their services or
even discontinuing their investment altogether. 237 With no competing services, Google would
have more incentives to increase prices to traders for being included in its Shopping Unit and
fewer incentives to improve the quality of its service. 2 38
Objective, Subjective, or No Acceptable Justifications at All?
The final crucial question is whether there is an acceptable justification for Google's
conduct, as Google did not demonstrate that its conduct was objectively necessary or that
beneficial efficiencies to consumers outweighed the exclusionary effects on rivals. 239
First, Google contended that, despite its engagement in the demotion of its direct
competitors, it was entitled to reasonable discrimination by applying adjustment mechanisms
to maintain the relevance of its universal search. 2 40 This is not a difficult question for the courts
to answer. According to the earlier case law, a meeting-competition defense is unacceptable.
Although a dominant undertaking is permitted to take reasonable steps to protect its
commercial interests, it cannot strengthen or abuse its dominant position. 24 1 Google claimed to
rank sites on the merits of relevance alone, but it had subjected its direct competitors to a
different algorithm. This is not evidence of fair competition.
Second, Google relied on quality improvement as a defense. 242 In Astra Zeneca, in the
absence of any legitimate interests, the CJEU dismissed the appeal, adding that a dominant
undertaking cannot use "regulatory procedures" to prevent or make difficult the market entry
of competitors. This was not competition "on the merits."' 243 Nonetheless, the CJEUdismissed
the imposition of pharmacovigilance obligations on a dominant undertaking as an objective
justification for deregistering a marketing authorization.
Following Post-Denmark II, the CJEU looked for an objective justification that the
exclusionary effects might be outweighed by beneficial efficiencies to consumers. 2 44 In
addition, justifications from the area of consumer law, such as public health and product
liability for dangerous or inferior quality products, have both been rejected in Tetra Pak I and
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Hilti.2 45 In Tetra Pak II, the CJEU dismissed the appeal, as it was not for a dominant
undertaking to impose measures based on "technical considerations or considerations relating
to product liability, protection of public health or protection of its reputation." 2 4 6
Comparatively, things stand differently according to different institutional cultures. In the
US and the UK, competition authorities are also responsible for consumer protection. However,
it remains puzzling why the FTC considered product design to be an important parameter of
"competition based on quality" rather than consumer protection, and how Google's product
improvements through algorithmic changes did not harm consumers. 2 47 The evidence before
the FTC had then indicated that following Google's design changes, the anticompetitive effects
on rivals were negligible. 24 8 In the dissenting opinion, there is skepticism expressed over how
it would be best for Google to distribute its search space among organic searches and paid
advertisements, and over its algorithms for ranking websites. In contrast, the CBC had evidence
that Google used certain AdWords clauses with an exclusionary intent vis-a-vis rival searchengines. 249 With no technical or efficiency justifications, Google accepted commitments.
Compared to the EC, it is submitted that both the CBC and the FTC adopted a lenient approach
to Google, compelled by the evidence adduced before it to accept Google's justification of
demotion. Particularly, in Canada, an algorithmic demotion was necessary to prevent an
artificial increase in ranking 250 that was not based on content quality or relevance alone. Again,
the bar was set too high, as the CBC awaited actual effects on rivals, such as lost sales or
revenues.

A similar reasoning was behind Justice Roth's ruling in the UK Streetmap case. As the CCI
had also noted, with approval, Google could not, technically, display rival maps without
seriously damaging Google Maps. 2 11 Although Article 102 has no corresponding defense
similar to Article 101 (3), the case law can illuminate this further. The authority relied upon by
Justice Roth is Post Denmark II, with emphasis on the principle of proportionality. 2 52 In
addition, J. Roth referred to paragraph 30 of the EC's soft-law on Article 102 (the Guidance
Paper), where beneficial efficiencies to consumers may also consist of "technical
improvements in the quality of goods."'
Third, it would be unprecedented for the EU courts to accept a similar recognition.
Otherwise, any decision by a dominant undertaking looking to improve product quality could
serve as a defense. However, to pass the proportionality test, the defense would need to be
objectively necessary and benefit consumers in the public interest. Similarly, in the US,
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networks that create or prolong a monopoly must demonstrate a reasonable business
justification proportionateto the harm.253
Even if, out of sentimentality for an efficient monopolist such as Google, one was to accept
an argument based on the proportionality of applying reasonable adjustments, the third ground
is particularly weak as it relies on a purely subjective justification that Google cannot rank itself
in the same way as it ranks direct competitors. Otherwise, this would affect Google's revenues,
for example, the ability to monetize space on universal search. 254 So far, any commercial
justification has had to be objectively justifiable; for example, a sale under costs due to a
liquidation of stock caused by insolvency would threaten the economic viability of the
undertaking in question. In the real world, would this be the case for Google with billions of
dollars from advertising?
Fourth, Google relied on infringements of its fundamental freedoms to conduct its business
and impart information. 2 5 Again, these claims are particularly weak in this context because
Google continues to operate its business in the EU, and, in the worst-case scenario, such
fundamental rights are yet to be balanced against the fundamental right to privacy, and the
principle of nondiscrimination and undistorted competition, as embedded in Protocol 27.256
Expost, Regulation 2019/1150 will apply to constructive refusals to deal with customers of
intermediation platforms. Should the latter suspend or terminate the service by demoting
individual listings or dimming a business through a lowering of rankings, such platforms must
offer a statement of reasons to the businesses concerned. 257 Otherwise, an unfair refusal by
intermediation platforms with superiorbargaining power can be challenged.
Retroactively, this regulatory response comes a little too late for Google, but it clarifies that
Google has a duty to offer reasons for its algorithmic changes to businesses that depend on
Google for universal search inclusiveness. Overruling the earlier limitations of the case law on
objective justifications could still be difficult for corporations with superior market power,
which, beyond a special responsibility, not to abuse their position, will now have an additional
responsibility for transparency and fairness. However, this excludes disclosures of trade
secrets 25s to businesses or users. A waiver of the notice period is possible for illegal incidents,
for example, fraud or cyber threats, which makes exclusiveness an exception rather than the
norm. 259
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independent platforms, subsequently falling under Facebook's ownership, such as WhatsApp,
Oculus, and Masquerade, BKartA did not accept a "common" contractual purpose as a legal
justification. 261
Similar to Google, Facebook sought to defend itself by suggesting that limiting its data
processing would unreasonably interfere with Facebook's product design. 2 62 On the contrary,
BKartA contended that product design could enable "unlimited" data processing serving
Facebook's sole commercial interests. 26 3 Irrespective of how this serves Facebook's business
model, it could not be objectively justified. 264 Instead, Facebook's reliance on Al data clashes
with the German understanding of privacy, as "informational self-determination" 2 65 Thus,
contractual autonomy could explain any lack of consent.
Upon a closer look at all the special justifications offered by Article 6 (1) GDPR, BKartA
found no objective justification for Facebook's conduct beyond Facebook's subjective
commercial interests. 266 It also dismissed efficiency or quality as a justification for
personalization. 267 Thus, an efficiency defense for Facebook's social networking remained
limited due to its data-driven business model, especially the combination of data for targeted
advertising. 268
Furthermore, BKartA recognized that service integration based on data combinations
between Facebook and Instagram or WhatsApp could leverage market power, exclude potential
competitors, and erect barriers to others such as Snapchat. 269 On the positive side, it was
recognized that such combinations are beneficial to platform users for direct communication.
However, as switching becomes unnecessary, this induces a lock-in effect on users with the
risk of entry barriers. 27 0 On the negative side, Google Analytics is far better than Facebook
Analytics, as the former anonymizes the IP addresses of its users.27 1
On careful consideration of the relevant interests, none of Facebook's commercial interests
outweighed the legitimate interests of its users, including their privacy rights. 272 While the
261
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average user would expect some tracking to occur, it could never be at a "level of intensity"
that comes across as a "massive invasion of privacy with active fingerprinting."2 73 The BKartA
clearly articulated that users' reasonable privacy interests 27 4 "must take precedence" over
Facebook's purely subjective commercial reasons.
Finally, it was concluded that there is a "gross imbalance" between Facebook's commercial
interests and its users' fundamental rights. 2 75 For such an imbalance, it would be nearly
impossible to calculate the economic harm caused to consumers. However, this lack of
quantification could not, ultimately, be used as a defense. 276 Irrespective of the above
arguments' soundness, the HRC took the view that BKartA cannot balance either other
legitimate interests against unfair terms or the previous case law (Gegenwert I and II) to infer
an abuse of market power. The former balancing refers to unequal bargaining power, while the
latter implies the consideration of interests under the general clause of competition law.
The HRC remained skeptical that Facebook had breached the data protection law and,
moreover, that Facebook's combination of data from its other services that fall under its
ownership amounts to an exploitative abuse of consumers. The HRC required that Facebook's
conduct harms competition in accordance with the as-if-competition standard under Section 19
(2), no. 2, followed by a comprehensive consideration of the relevant interests, especially free
competition with open markets. 27 7
However, the HRC adopted a different interpretation of Gegenwert 11278 to suggest that an
unfair condition imposed by a dominant undertaking, which breaches the generallaw on unfair
contractual terms, does not automatically trigger an unfair condition under the special clause
of Section 19. For this to be the case, there is a need for behavioralcausality and an exploitative
abuse of the other market participants. 2 7 9 This is in line with the special responsibility of the
dominant undertaking.
Following Gegenwert I and II and Pechstein rulings, several commentators had previously
argued that, in contrast to the comparable market price for excessive pricing under Section 19
(2), no 2, for the application of Section 19 (1), there is no need for a behavioral or an
instrumentalcausal link between a dominant position and abusive conduct. 280 Unsurprisingly,
the SC did not follow the HRC when it had argued that an exploitative abuse under Section 19
(1) does not always require the existence of a direct link between the dominant position and
the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Rather, an outcome or effects-based causal link between
that position and its effect on the market would suffice. 28 1 This is indeed the case where the
273
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dominant undertaking's behavior has led to certain effects on that market, which would not
have arisen under effective competition, and the alleged behavior is not only exploitative but
also capable of impeding competition. Finally, the SC recognized the normative nature of
causality, which does not demand an instrumental causality between exploitative abuse and
dominance.28 2 HRC's stricter requirement for causality is unnecessary. 28 3 Although one cannot
dispense causality altogether in a classic case of tying caused by a dominant position, 284 a
flexible approach to causality was justifiable because Facebook's behavior was objectively
capable of obstructing competition. 285 Following a paternalistic approach to causality, the SC
stated that a stricter requirement would burden users with the harmful effects of Facebook's
behavior. 28 6 Such effects cannot be looked upon in isolation due to the dual-sided nature of
Facebook's online platform. 2 87
Most importantly, the SC went on to acknowledge an effects-based causality for dual-sided
platforms where the exploitative behavior of a dominant platform's intermediaries affects
competition in the market found to be dominant as well as the other side of the said market. 28 8
Accordingly, there is an exploitative abuse of a dominant position where, although Facebook
has undertaken in its terms of use to offer a "personalized" experience to its users, Facebook
collects and thereby acquires its users' data when accessing Internet pages outside Facebook.
The latter's subsidiaries, such as Instagram, WhatsApp, Masquerade, and Oculus, have
acquired users' data. For harvesting personal data, Facebook Business Tools also allow thirdparty companies to tie their Internet pages or mobile apps to Facebook. Furthermore, Facebook
Analytics provides these companies with their users' behavioral data.2 89
However, HRC's criticism of BKartA's "short-sighted" approach 29 0 to causality is incorrect.
Facebook's market dominance has been further strengthened by the combination of data
acquired from previously independent platforms for social networking such as WhatsApp
(mobile phone numbers), Instagram (photos), Oculus (games and virtual reality), and
Masquerade (selfies and videos).
According to the HRC, in both Gegenwert I and II, there was "obvious" harm to
competition.211 In addition, in GegenwertII, there was an exploitative abuse of a long-standing
contractual relationship where termination of and withdrawal from the relationship had been
made difficult due to a stronger bargaining position. 292 By analogy, the HRC ruled out rather
inflexible that there was no harm to "free and open" competition and no exploitative abuse of
Facebook's users through the combination of their data across all platforms.
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One other factual disagreement about an infringement of Section 138 of the German Civil
Code is unclear. The HRC could have referred to the principle of good faith in transactions,
contrary to public policy. Instead, it advanced that there must be an "excessive or
disproportionate" price, which had exploited "a structural inferiority of the business
partner," 2 93 ' by which the HRC means an unequal bargaining position.
Section 138 (2) automatically makes an abusive exploitation of another party's
"inexperience, lack of sound judgment or considerable weakness of consent," where there is a
contractual promise or an offer of disproportionate pecuniary advantages. However, when there
is an intersection of contract law with unfair competition, an unfair business practice does not
automatically invalidate the contractual relationship. Unfairness and public morals under
Section 138 are opposites of business law and ethics.2 94 Likewise, Regulation (EU) 2019/1150
considers that other means through which intermediation platforms offer less favorable terms,
and conditions fall under competition and unfair commercial practices. 29 5 The transparency
obligation imposed on intermediation platforms to justify economic, commercial, or legal
considerations does not affect the above areas.
It is therefore astonishing for the HRC to suggest that excessive or disproportionate fees
imposed by a dominant undertaking are not a competition issue unless such fees meet the
hypothetical as-if-competition scenario. The critical aspect of this legal interpretation is that
Section 138 captures the general principle of abusive exploitation, from which Section 19 (2),
no 2 and its equivalent Article 102 (2) (a) are derived as special prohibitions of abusive
exploitation. The major difference here is that the special prohibitions capture exploitation by
a dominant business, while the general prohibition lowers the bar for intervention. As the
general prohibition applies irrespective of whether there is a monetary consideration; for
example, performance in return for a promise, one can imply that the same would be true for
the special prohibition. Therefore, this article advances the latter interpretation by analogy. It
argues that Facebook promised privacy in return for acceptance of its terms and conditions,
which were onerously intrusive due to the loss of an economic right to privacy. Having shared
its users' preferences and choices, and their location with third-party analytics and advertisers,
Facebook harms competition.
Facebook also made unfair disclosures of economic privacy to predict its users' reservation
price in contractual transactions. 296 In a hypothetical scenario, users will have perfect
information about Facebook's transactions with third-party advertisers. However, will
Facebook compensate its users for sharing their data with advertisers? In 2017 alone, Facebook
made $39 billion in profits from targeted advertising, 297 which is disproportionate to users
paying nothing, although users pay Facebook with their joint data.
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In contrast, the HRC argued that there is no reliable evidence that the consolidation of
platform data has significantly increased Facebook's advertising revenues. 2 98 Nonetheless, this
is not a valid reason to dismiss BKartA's competence to evaluate Facebook's unfair terms and
conditions. Following Asnef Equifax, one could have clarified how sensitive data issues may
not fall under the remit of competition law. 2 99 In contrast, the SC ruled that the fact that data
protection must be observed for the application of competition law does not rule out BKartA's
competence.3 00
It was, therefore, wrong for the HRC to deny a fundamental right to privacy under the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 8), contrary to the Pechstein ruling concerning the
freedom to exercise a profession under the German Constitution. The same holds for the
absolute necessity of a behavioral causality whereby, in addition to the exploitation of users,
Facebook must also strengthen its dominant position by weakening its competitors through
exclusionary conduct. 301 Ultimately, the SC emphatically recognized that the constitutional
right to autonomous self-determination applies to the interpretation of general civil clauses, as
in Section 19.302 In this respect, the SC afforded private individuals the same level of protection
as under public law.
Following Hoffmann-LaRoche's formula, namely, independently of its competitors,
customers, and consumers, the HRC reached a conclusion that irrespective of whether a
dominant undertaking such as Facebook imposes unfair or inappropriate conditions on
consumers, its conduct must also lead to a strengthening of Facebook's position or a weakening
of the competitive market structure. Such an outcome is obvious, as Facebook strengthened its
dominant position through multiple combinations of its users' data. While it is unclear why the
HRC reached so many fundamentally flawed conclusions, one may find some support in the
claim advanced by Chopra and Khan that generalist judges "struggle" to identify
anticompetitive behavior. 30 3
In fairness, any justifications brought by either Google or Facebook about sharing data for
legal reasons of national security and defense are unacceptable before the EU courts.
Otherwise, EU citizens become tools of transnational corporations' mass-surveillancewhether for advertising or not.
Overall, the above analysis of recent cases is less about criticizing the competition
authorities for acting in the presence of anticompetitive conduct. Instead, it is about not
conspiring in favor of the most powerful corporations. Therefore, the EU courts should think
carefully about tipping the balance in favor of corporations with no soul as they record huge
profits on the merits of the user data they do not own. Adopting the interpretation by analogy,
as advanced above, will allow the courts to fill in the legislative gap.
A Final Word About the Remedy
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As the choice of the remedy may decide the fate of an undertaking, it is always best to choose
the least intrusive measure that preserves its business's operational integrity. In Google
Shopping, the EC asked for an equal treatment remedy.3 0 4 One may feel vindicated as, although
the decision remains obscure for some commentators regarding the novelty of the abuse relied
upon, the choice of the remedy says it all. It is nothing that we have not seen before as part of
a wider understanding of economic discrimination and unequal treatment with the usual human
rights connotations. This brings us back to the stone age of competition law. Although in the
digital age one might have expected a novel type of abuse, the reality is that we do not need to
change competition rules if we abide by well-established principles. In Facebook, a divestiture
of data will be a welcome development in the right direction.3 0 5 Thus, it is impossible to break
up transnational monopolies such as Google or Facebook extraterritorially. It is the
responsibility of the FTC's taskforce that they wish to break up Silicon Valley giants. European
competition authorities have done a brilliant job to deter such corporate giants from
anticompetitive conduct with harsher fines than anywhere else in the world. In Germany, the
SC has, meanwhile, annulled Facebook's appeal before the HRC Dusseldorf and ordered
Facebook to pay E30 million as court proceedings costs. 306 It is too early to talk about a remedy
for the Amazon case; thus, it is worth recognizing that some commentators argue that
divestiture has "ambiguous" effects 307 on consumer welfare, which is in sharp contrast to the
US antitrust history of divestiture since StandardOil, American Tobacco, Alcoa, Paramount,
United Shoe Machinery, and AT&T. 308 Thus, one may agree that a marketplace is not an
essential facility when compared to similar other e-commerce platforms, such as Walmart,
Wayfair, Etsy, and others. Again, this leaves us with the conventional choice of behavioral
remedy.
Conclusion
The critical analysis of cross-jurisdictional enforcement reveals the global leadership of the EC
and its influence worldwide, especially in India, where the CCI transplanted the special
responsibility following the principles of nondiscrimination and equal treatment. However, it
also reveals how the FTC continues to remain a source of inspiration for the EC. The latter is
bolder than the former with its interpretation of objective justifications and the theory of
leveraging.
The BKartA deserves special praise for daring to propose an Einsteinian speculative theory
of consumer harm stemming from the combination of data across platforms. Although met with
harsh criticism from the HRC, one could also criticize this court for lacking substance, ignoring
the gaps of the tripartite enforcement system, and overlooking privacy as a fundamental
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economic right of users. However, the SC's interpretation has superbly adjusted to the digital
age's needs while emphatically protecting consumers as autonomous users.
This article has argued that the self-preferencing categorization of abuse in Google Shopping
is unfortunate, as it does not capture the exclusionary demotion of alternative offerings that can
only lead to consumer harm. It has also forcefully exposed the flaws in the HRC's interpretation
of abuse of an excessive disclosure of data combinations by Facebook, especially regarding
the requisite legal standard and the causal link. However, if one were to sum up the above cases
in concise-and not merely catchy words-recognition must be for the constitutional
dimension of competition law. The latter enforces the principles of nondiscrimination with
equal treatment and autonomous self-determination in Google Shopping and Facebook,
respectively, asking for dominant undertakings to compete fairly, treat remaining competitors
equally, and respect consumers' freedom of choice when offering, rather than imposing,
allegedly free product enhancements. Unfortunately, combinations of personal data have been
the price that users have paid for such enhancements.
Furthermore, one can go further beyond to advance the argument that these two cases
effectively consolidate the horizontal human rights dimension of competition law, as has been
embedded in quasi-constitutional EU freedoms of free and fair competition for businesses as
well as free choice for consumers.
Higher national and EU courts should protect EU citizens' wellbeing as consumers of global
search, social media, and marketplaces where transnational corporate giantism effectively
captures consumers for behavioral discrimination. Therefore, millions of EU users should not
be trapped in a vicious circle of blame-taking by unfair consumer contracts and data processing,
where the real problem is a transnational monopoly over their collective data. One cannot
accept an extraterritorial application of national security and defense mechanisms of masssurveillance by transnational corporations for sharing the aggregated data of EU consumers.
While one may accept that these cases are a test for competition law boundaries, it is
important to note that they are not breaking new ground when applying nondiscrimination,
equal, and fair treatment principles. Following the recent helpful guidance of Regulation
2019/1150, we have reasons to remain optimistic that the EU courts will elegantly address the
challenges of behavioral discrimination exposed in this article.
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